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This dissertation addresses open issues in complementary goods merg-
ers and tacit collusion as it relates to the freight railroad industry. It provides
a broad overview of the freight railroad industry, its leading players, the rate-
setting process, and describes dynamics in the markets of different commodities
shipped. The standard literature on tacit collusion concentrates on how it in-
fluences the pricing of substitutes. However, collusion is also likely to influence
the pricing of complements. For example, in static equilibrium, if two local
monopolists were selling complementary products, they would charge a higher
price than if both products were offered by a single multiproduct monopo-
list, reducing both the industry profits and the consumer surplus. However,
if firms were able to coordinate, they could reach a Pareto improvement by
lowering prices to the monopolist level. Therefore, in the markets where firms
sell both substitutes and perfect complements, the welfare effect of coordina-
tion is ambiguous. The dissertation analyses this question in the context of
the US freight railroad industry. Using rail waybill data, I find evidence that
vi
prices are higher on average in markets where the route is served jointly by
two or more railroads, and thus inefficiency from the pricing of complements
is present. I then estimate a structural model where firms set prices a la
Bertrand and conduct merger simulations for the firms that sell complements
in many markets. I find that mergers are welfare enhancing. They benefit
the consumer and merging parties but hurt outsiders. In the last chapter, I
estimate a structural model of competition with conduct parameter defined as
a function of multimarket contact. I compare industry welfare to the counter-
factual of breaking tacit collusion and full monopoly and find that the former
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Chapter 1
Overview of the U.S. freight railroad industry
1.1 Introduction
Freight railroads play an essential role in the U.S. economy. They allow
for a more efficient trade between businesses around the country and abroad.
Freight railroads hauled 1,616 million tons of freight valued at almost $600
billion in 2012 (Sprung et al. (2018)). Railroads are an essential player in
the nation’s freight shipping industry. According to Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (2018), in 2012 freight railroads carried 34.6% of freight by ton-mile,
slightly behind trucks that hauled 38.2%, and well ahead oil pipelines (17.3%),
domestic water transportation (9.6%), and air (0.2%).
Freight railroads haul a wide variety of commodities. They move coal
from mines in coal basins to coal-fired power plants around the country, au-
tomobiles from car manufacturers to dealerships, grains from grain elevators
to mills and food manufacturers, intermodal containers from ports to their
final destination. Coal is the largest commodity by tons shipped, in 2003 over
600 million tons were hauled by freight railroads1. The second place was split
by intermodal (shipments in intermodal containers) and metals and minerals
1Surface Transportation Board Carload Waybill Sample, 2003-2014.
1
with about 170 million tons shipped. In terms of revenues, coal and inter-
modal shipments both collected close to $8 billion in 2003. This reflects the
low value of bulk commodities such as coal and metals and minerals. From
2003 to 2014 the amount of coal shipped decreased slightly, while intermodal
shipments grew, pushing coal shipments to the second place by revenue.
Commodities shipped by freight railroads are very heterogeneous, and
demand for rail services is closely linked with the demand for the commodity.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand the dynamics in the industry of the
shipper to be able to conduct a proper economic analysis of the freight railroad
industry. The main goal of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the
U.S. freight railroad industry, its leading players, and dynamics in shipments
of different commodities.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 I
describe the classification of freight railroads, provide statistics for the largest
companies, and show the structure of their networks. In section 3 I dive deep
into the different commodities shipped, describe main geographic markets,
most popular products hauled, discuss rate and quantity trends over time.
Section 4 concentrates on the two main ways to set rates in the freight railroad
industry, tariffs, and contracts. It also specifies what enters into the rate-
setting process. Section 5 concludes.
2
1.2 Freight Railroad Companies
The U.S. government classifies freight railroads based on annual rev-
enues. Seven Class I carriers operate nationwide which include companies
with operating revenues of $447.6 million or more (in 2017 dollars). Class I
railroads make up just 1 percent of freight railroad companies in the country,
but around 94 percent of industry revenue, 69 percent of freight rail mileage,
and 90 percent of employees are attributed to them. Non-Class I railroads are
split into regional and short line railroads. Regional railroads typically operate
routes of about 500 miles within two to four states. Shortlines generally exist
to interchange traffic with other railroads or to link nearby industries.
There are 7 class I railroads in the U.S., combined they operated over
120 thousand miles of road in 2014. Table 1.1 provides statistics of Class I
railroads. BNSF and UP are the two largest companies both by miles of road
operated, revenue, and the number of employees. CSXT and NS split the
second place. While two Canadian companies, CP and CN, and KCS that
































































































































































































































































































































































Freight railroads are the owners of infrastructure, including tracks,
bridges, stations, and junction yards. Apart from the rare cases when haulage
or trackage rights are granted to another railroad company, the owner of the
tracks is the sole operator on the line. Figure 1.1 illustrates the network of
U.S. freight railroads. Two geographical duopolies exist: CSX and Norfolk
Southern (NS) compete in the eastern part of the country, while Union Pacific
(UP) and BNSF cover the West. Canadian Pacific Railway (CP) offers routes
in the northern part of the U.S. and Canada, while Canadian National (CN)
connects North with the Gulf of Mexico. Kansas City Southern (KCS) offer
routes in the South and Mexico. There is no single transcontinental railroad
connecting east and west coast. A customer that need to move freight from
coast to coast would need to employ services of two independent railroads with
an interchange of freight around Mississippi river tunnel.
Staggers Act deregulated the U.S. rail industry in 1980. It gave greater
pricing freedom to railroads, eased and streamlined mergers, and permitted
confidential contracts with shippers. The industry is subject to antitrust im-
munities and is regulated by the Surface Transportation Board (STB). STB
is in charge of resolving railroad rate and service disputes, mergers, rail line
sales, new line construction and abandonment. Deregulation led to today’s
concentrated industry. There were 33 class I railroads in 1980, and there are
only seven today. This process of consolidation came to at least a temporary
end at the turn of the 21st century. In early 2000s BNSF and CN proposed
an end-to-end merger to form a first transcontinental railroad in the U.S. The
5
Figure 1.1: U.S. National Rail Network
Surface Transportation Board (STB) was opposed to the merger and first im-
posed a temporary freeze on Class I rail mergers and then issued new merger
rules that significantly complicated the merger process. No mergers of Class I
railroads have been proposed in the meantime.
1.3 Commodities Shipped
In this section, I will dive deeper into nine main commodity groups
shipped by railroads, describe dynamics in each of them, leading players and
largest geographic markets. I do so by analyzing STB Carload Waybill Sam-
ple and additional data sources and reports provided by the industry of a
6
particular commodity group. I have access to the unmasked confidential STB
Carload Waybill Sample (CWS) for the years 2003 through 2014. CWS is
a stratified sample of individual railroad shipment records submitted to the
STB. Only freight rail carriers that terminate at least 4,500 revenue carloads
annually submit data to the CWS. The sample includes information about
origin and destination, the distance of haul, goods transported, their weight,
railroads participating in the movement, revenue collected etc2. For a revenue
variable, I add all relevant columns from CWS that include Freight Revenue,
Fuel Surcharge, and Miscellaneous Charges. All revenues are in 2009 dollars.
1.3.1 Automotive Products
Automotive products commodity group covers STCC code 371 and in-
cludes motor vehicles, passenger car bodies, motor bus or truck bodies, motor
vehicle parts and accessories, and truck trailers. Most commonly shipped
product in the commodity group in 2014 was passenger motor vehicles (auto)
with about 21 million tons shipped. Freight motor vehicles occupied the sec-
ond place with 8.3 million tons, and auto parts was the third most populous
product with about 1.1 million tons shipped. Most of the products in this
commodity group are being shipped to or from automobile manufacturing
facilities or assembly plants. According to the Association of American Rail-
roads (2018) (AAR), 75% of new cars and light trucks were hauled by freight
2Small percentage of interlined traffic in CWS was rebilled: reported as two separate
shipments. These shipments were linked back together to match commodity flows in The
Freight Analysis Framework. See more details in Appendix.
7
railroads in 2017. Some auto transport companies that help individuals ship
cars also work with freight railroad companies, but that is by far a much lower
share of shipments.
Figure 1.2: Automotive Products Rail Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 indicate origins and destinations of freight rail-
road shipment by the number of tons shipped in 2014. According to AAR
freight railroads serve more than 70 automobile manufacturing facilities and
assembly plants in North America. The plants are spread out across the U.S.
with General Motors Company operating facilities in Texas, Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Kansas, Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee, and Missouri; Ford Motor Company
in Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, and Ohio; Fiat Chrysler Automo-
biles in Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio; Tesla Motors in California; Toyota Motor
Corporation in Kentucky, Indiana, Texas, California, and Mississippi; Honda
Motor Company in Ohio, Alabama, and Indiana; Nissan Motor Company in
8
Figure 1.3: Automotive Products Rail Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Tennessee and Mississippi; Subaru Corporation in Indiana; Hyundai Motor
Company in Alabama; Kia Motors in Georgia, Volkswagen Group in Ten-
nessee; Volvo Cars, BMW Group, and Daimler AG in South Carolina.
Many automotive products shipments are in carload quantities, in CWS
only a handful of waybills had more than one carload. Railroads have designed
specialized railcars to move automobiles; they are commonly referred to as
autoracks. They usually have two or three decks, and some of them can
carry over 20 vehicles. Larger vehicles and parts are often transported on flat
cars. The average load per car in the CWS is about 22 tons, and the average
distance traveled is about 950 miles. The average revenue per ton-mile ranged
from $0.126 in 2004 to $0.217 in 2012. Ton-miles per year have significantly
dropped during the recession from 37.8 billion in 2007 to 16.1 billion in 2009.
9
Figure 1.4: Automotive Products Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Ton-miles have been on a recovery path since then, in 2014 they reached 30.2
billion. Revenue also dropped from $3.5 billion in 2007 to $2.1 billion in 2009.
However, due to the increased rates, it has well surpassed prerecession revenue
by 2014. Figure 1.4 shows how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-
miles shipped and revenue per ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are
normalized to equal to one in 2003.
1.3.2 Chemicals, Fertilizer and Plastic
Chemicals are essential to the production of a large number of manu-
factured products and are used by other major industries such as agriculture,
10
clothing, and water utilities. According to the American Chemistry Council,
U.S. accounts for almost 20% of the world chemicals production and is among
the top chemical producers in the world.
Chemicals, fertilizer, and plastic commodity group includes 2-digit STCC
codes 28 and 49. It covers all chemicals and allied products, and hazardous
materials. Major component commodities include organic and inorganic in-
dustrial chemicals (3-digit STCC 281, e.g., ammonia, chlorine, other industrial
gases, and alcohols), plastics and synthetic fibers (3-digit STCC 282), and agri-
cultural chemicals including fertilizers (3-digit STC 287).
Majority of the shipments in this commodity group are classified as
non-hazardous; however, a substantial part is hazardous materials. Most com-
mon hazardous chemicals shipped by rail are ammonia, the foundation for
the nitrogen fertilizer industry, and chlorine, used in chlorination as a part of
municipal water treatment. Transportation of hazardous materials is subject
to strict oversight and specific regulations on operating rules and tank car
standards that can be costly to railroads.
According to Energy Department Office of Energy Efficiency & Re-
newable Energy (2018)he production of basic chemicals is concentrated near
the regions where petroleum and natural gas materials are produced, mainly
along the Gulf Coast, the Delaware Valley, and the Midwest. Chemical prod-
ucts derived from petroleum (petrochemicals) are primarily produced in Texas
and Louisiana. Other chemicals, such as plastics, pharmaceuticals, and fertil-
izers, are produced in a variety of locations throughout the country. Figure
11
Figure 1.5: Chemicals, Fertilizer and Plastic Rail Tonnage by Origin County,
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
1.5 shows the origins of rail shipments by county and tonnage. The origins
roughly overlay with the leading chemical production regions.
End-users of the chemicals are spread among different industries and
geographical locations. Chemical shipment destinations are very widely dis-
persed. Figure 1.6 shows rail shipment destinations for chemicals, fertilizer,
and plastic commodity group.
Small sizes of chemical shipments and regulations on hazmat materials
do not allow shippers to organize lower-cost rail shipments to a single des-
tination and use economies of scale that rail transportation provides. Truck
transportation of chemicals usually has lower cost and offers more flexibility.
Some chemical companies even own truck fleet to reduce the cost of ship-
ment. Trucking is most widely used for small volume shipments. According to
12
Figure 1.6: Chemicals, Fertilizer and Plastic Rail Tonnage by Termination
County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
the American Chemistry Council (2017), more than half of all chemicals are
transported by truck, with rail and water transportation splitting the other
half.
Many chemical shipments are in rather small quantities; the CWS an-
nual averages have ranged from 1.1 to 1.48 carloads per waybill. Hopper and
tank cars are most commonly used to move chemicals. The average load per
car in the CWS is about 94 tons, and the average distance traveled is about
850 miles. The average revenue per ton-mile ranged from $0.045 in 2004 to
$0.073 in 2013. Ton-miles per year were steadily growing from 83.3 billion in
2003 to 171 billion in 2014 with a slight drop during the recession. Revenue
also grew from $3 billion in 2003 to$7.9 billion in 2014. Figure 1.7 shows
how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and revenue per
13
Figure 1.7: Chemicals, Fertilizer and Plastic Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM
Trends, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal to one in
2003.
1.3.3 Coal
Coal is a leading commodity in terms of tons originated by freight rail-
roads. It accounted for approximately one-third of billed tons moved by freight
railroads in 2014. However, due to being a low-value bulk commodity, coal oc-
cupies the second place by revenue. To provide the coal industry overview, I
will be mainly relying on the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
Coal Data Browser.
14
Coal is one of the primary energy sources in the U.S. Its production
was at the record levels in the early 2000s, with 1,171 million tons produced in
2008. Since then, total production had declined to about 1,000 million tons in
2014. Figure 1.8 shows the major U.S. coal supply regions. Coal production
is highly concentrated in Powder River Basin, that spans through southeast
Montana and northeast Wyoming; Central and Northern Appalachia, located
in the eastern U.S., along the length of Appalachia (in the states of Ohio, the
western part of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, the eastern part of Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Alabama); Illinois Basin, that includes Illinois, Indiana, and
west Kentucky; Uinta Basin of Colorado and Utah.
Figure 1.9 describes production of coal by basin from 2003 to 2014.
Powder River Basin (PRB), where annual production of coal accounted for
approximately 42% of the country’s production in 2014, had reached a peak
of coal production in 2008 and an immediate decline after that. The demand
for PRB coal was rising because the Clean Air Act was limiting sulfur dioxide
emissions, and PBR coal has low sulfur content. Illinois Basin is the only
region where coal production was constantly growing in the years of interest.
Some of the reasons for the growth is that coal there is cheaper to mine, and
the region has a favorable position for shipment of coal to ports for exports.
Central Appalachia has seen the highest level of decline in production, in 2008
it accounted for about 22% of the U.S. coal production, while in 2014 for only
12%.
Electric Power sector is by far the biggest consumer of coal. In 2014
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Figure 1.8: Major U.S. Coal Supply Regions
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Office of Energy Analysis. EIA-
AEO 2014, Figure 7.
93% of coal was purchased to produce electricity at coal-fired generating units.
According to EIA, some of the largest coal-fired plants receive 1-2 unit trains
of coal each day, with approximately 115 cars in a train and 116 tons of coal
in an average car, resulting in more than 26,000 tons of coal burned a day.
However, consumption by Electric Power sector has fallen by about 15% from
2003 to 2014. Coke plants and other industrial users each consume about
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Figure 1.9: Coal Production by Basin, 2003-2014
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. List of mines for all coal, total,
United States, all mine statuses.
2-5 % of coal. Texas is the biggest consumer of coal, with 101 million tons
consumed in 2014. Illinois occupies the second place with 51 million tons of
coal consumed by the electric power sector.
The U.S. imports coal in small quantities. Some coal-burning power
plants located close to seaports sometimes find it cheaper to import coal from
other countries than to obtain coal from U.S. coal-producing regions. Imports
had fallen from 25 million tons in 2003 to about 11 million tons in 2014. Ex-
ports of coal have been steadily growing from 2003 to 2012 and have fallen
slightly in 2014. In 2012 the U.S exported about 126 million tons of coal. The
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rise in export of coal was mainly due to entering European and Asian markets.
According to EIA, the recent drop in export is due to lower European demand
and increased global supply. The largest consumers of U.S. coal in 2014 were
Brazil, South Korea, the Netherlands, Canada, Italy, United Kingdom, and
Japan. As shown in figure 1.10, growing demand from Europe and Asia re-
sulted in an increased tonnage of coal passing through Atlantic and Gulf ports.
Figure 1.10: U.S. Coal Exports by Customs District, 2002-2013
Source: Coal-by-Rail: A Business-as-Usual Reference Case, Argonne, Energy Sys-
tems Division
Origins of freight railroad movements of coal are shown in figure 1.11.
They mostly overlap with major coal basins. Figure 1.12 shows coal termi-
nation counties by volume. They are spread around the country with some
concentration in ports, where coal leaves the country for export.
Figure 1.13 shows dynamics of coal transportation by mode. Majority
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Figure 1.11: Coal Rail Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.12: Coal Rail Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
of the coal is being moved by freight railroads. In 2014 the share of the
railroad in coal transportation market was 68.5%. Truck and river barges split
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the second place, with 11 and 13% respectively. Transportation by water is
considered to be the cheapest option when available. The share of coal moved
by river slowly but steadily increased from about 8% in 2004 to about 13%
in 2014. Wyoming, a state that produces the largest amount of coal in the
U.S. is located far from waterways, and most electrical utilities, therefore, the
railroad is the dominating mode of transportation in the region. Conveyors
and Tramways are primarily used for short distances between coal mines and
nearby coal-burning facilities.
Figure 1.13: U.S. Coal Tranport by Mode, 2002-2013
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration. Annual Coal Distribution Report
Most of the coal is being moved in unit trains. The unit train usually
consists of 100-150 cars that are carried from a single origin to a single desti-
nation. Gondola and hopper cars are usually used to transport coal. Gondola
has 121 tons carrying capacity, while hopper car has 102. The most signifi-
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cant volume of coal is being transported from Powder River Basin (specifically
Casper BEA Area) to coal-fired power plants and exporting points in St. Louis,
Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, Kansas City, and Houston BEA Areas.
Figure 1.14: Coal Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
The average distance of coal shipments grew from 640 in 2003 to 840
in 2014. This is mainly due to the shift to production in PRB. The average
revenue per ton-mile ranged from $0.029 in 2006 to $0.040 in 2011. Ton-miles
shipped by freight railroads per year peaked in 2006 at 713 billion and were
falling ever since. Revenue grew until 2011 and fell in recent years. Figure
1.14 shows how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and
revenue per ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal
to one in 2003.
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1.3.4 Construction and Forest Products
Construction and forest products commodity group includes 2-digit
STCC codes 24 and 26. It covers primary forest or wood raw materials, all
lumber and wood products, all products from pulp mills, paper, paperboard
or fiberboard, containers or boxes, and building paper or board. These prod-
ucts are vital in the construction, manufacturing, and shipping segments of
the U.S. economy, and demand is highly correlated to economic growth and
demand for new residential and non-residential buildings.
Figure 1.15: Construction and Forest Products Rail Tonnage by Origin
County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Most production of construction and forest products is concentrated in
regions where substantial forest resources are located, such as Pacific North-
west (Washington, Oregon, Northern Idaho, and parts of Montana), Up-
per Midwest (northern Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan), New England
(mainly Maine), and parts of Southeastern U.S.(Louisiana, Arkansas, Missis-
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sippi, Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina, and Virginia). Figure
1.15 shows the origin of rail shipments by county and tonnage. Oregon is the
top exporter with over 5.4 million tons of construction and forest products
originating in the state in 2014. Alabama takes second place with 3.5 million
tons.
Figure 1.16: Construction and Forest Products Rail Tonnage by Termination
County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
End-users of construction and forest products are mainly located in
densely populated areas, manufacturing zones, and ports. Figure 1.6 shows
rail shipment destinations for construction and forest products commodity
group. California by far is the largest importer with 3.8 million tons of rail
shipment terminating within the state in 2014.
Construction and forest products are primarily shipped by truck. Ac-
cording to the Freight Analysis Framework, almost 90% of construction and
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forest products are transported by truck, with rail being the second most pop-
ular mode with about 7% modal share.
Figure 1.17: Construction and Forest Products Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM
Trends, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Many construction and forest products are in carload quantities, with
only a few waybills having more than one carload. Box and flat cars are most
commonly used to move products in this commodity group. The average load
per car in the CWS is about 80 tons, and the average distance traveled is about
950 miles. The average revenue per ton-mile ranged from $0.045 in 2004 to
$0.068 in 2014. Ton-miles per year were growing until 2005 where they reached
68 billion, declined until 2009 to 28 billion, and slightly recovered to 35 billion
in 2014. Total market revenue followed the trend of ton-miles. It peaked at
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$2.5 billion in 2006, bottomed at $1.2 billion in 2009, and partially recovered
to $.8 billion in 2014. Figure 1.17 shows how total revenue in the commodity
group, ton-miles shipped and revenue per ton-mile changes over the years.
Variables are normalized to equal to one in 2003.
1.3.5 Energy Products and Fuels
Energy products and fuels commodity group includes 3-digit STCC
code 291, 2-digit STCC 13, and STCC codes 29911, 29913 and 29914. The first
group is petroleum products; they include crude and all products of petroleum
refining, such as gasoline, jet or high volatile fuels, kerosene, distillate fuel oil,
lubricating oils and greases, asphalt pitches or tars, residual fuel oils, and
liquefied gases. The second group includes coal or coke briquettes, petroleum
coke, and coke produced from coal. Composition of products shipped within
this commodity group shifted a lot over the years. For example, petroleum
oil or shale oil (STCC 1311110) was the leader in terms of tons shipped by
freight railroads, with almost 25 million tons hauled. However, there are no
shipments with this commodity code before 2010. This is a result of the shale
oil boom. On the other hand, synthetic fuel derived from coal (STCC 2991191)
was occupying the first place by tons shipped in 2003, with close to 5 million
tons shipped, and no waybills with this commodity group were found in CWS
after 2007.
Figure 1.18 shows the origin of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
They are concentrated around the major oil fields in states of North Dakota,
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Figure 1.18: Energy Products and Fuels Rail Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
New Mexico, Texas, California, and Colorado. Additionally, there are sev-
eral coke plants located in Illinois, Alabama, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
The vast majority of crude oil produced in the U.S. is moved to petroleum
refineries. They are heavily concentrated along the Gulf Coast of Texas and
Louisiana. A smaller number of refineries are located in California, Washing-
ton, Illinois, and along the East Coast. Coke products are used mainly in
iron ore smelting. However, with the development of new technologies, natu-
ral gas steadily replaces coke in the U.S. steelmaking. Major steel-makers are
located in the states of Minnesota, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan,
Indiana, Texas, North Carolina, and others. Figure 1.19 shows termination of
rail shipments by county and tonnage.
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Figure 1.19: Energy Products and Fuels Rail Tonnage by Termination County,
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Energy products and fuels are primarily shipped by pipeline, with over
half of the tonnage being shipped this way. Truck occupies the second place
and takes about the quarter of the modal share. Trucks are usually used to
carry smaller capacities for short distances. Share of rail in energy products
and fuels shipments is relatively small, with about 5-7% of shipment. Rail is a
common way to move fuels for a long distance to areas where they do not have
pipelines set up. However, shipments of crude oil by rail have been growing
sharply in recent years. Figure 1.20 shows the main flows of crude oil by rail
in 2010 and 2014. According to EIA, crude-by-rail movements in the U.S. and
between the U.S. and Canada have doubled between 2010 and 2014.
Energy products and fuels are usually shipped in relatively small quan-
tities; the average number of carloads per waybill varied from 1.68 in 2009
27
Figure 1.20: Crude-by-Rail Movements, 2010 and 2014
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration based on data from the Surface
Transportation Board and other information.
to 3.16 in 2013. Tank cars are most commonly used to move products in this
commodity group. The average load per car in the CWS is about 80 tons. The
average distance grew from 697 in 2003 to 866 in 2014. The average revenue
per ton-mile ranged from $0.046 in 2003 to $0.063 in 2013. Ton-miles per year
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Figure 1.21: Energy Products and Fuels Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM
Trends, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
were growing until 2006, declined during the recession, and almost recovered
in the recent years to 2006 level. Ton-miles grew from 14 billion in 2003 to 24
billion in 2007, dropped to 12 billion in 2009, and skyrocketed to 77 billion in
2013. Total market revenue followed the trend of ton-miles. Figure 1.21 shows
how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and revenue per
ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal to one in
2003.
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1.3.6 Food and Beverages
Food and beverages commodity group includes 2-digit STCC codes 01,
except 0113 and 01144, and 02. The first group includes all farm products ex-
cept grains and soybeans. The second group includes food and kindred prod-
ucts, and grain mill products, such as flour, prepared feed, cereal preparations,
milled rice, wet corn milling or sorghum products, soybean cake. Soybean cake
that is used in animal feeds was a leading product shipped in the commodity
group in 2014, with 15 million tons shipped. Corn syrup was in second place
with 10 million tons.
Figure 1.22: Food and Beverages Rail Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.22 shows the origin of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
Shipments mostly originated in Midwest, and parts of Northwest and Califor-
nia.
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Figure 1.23: Food and Beverages Rail Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.23 shows termination of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
Destination locations are spread around the country and clustered around
densely populated and agricultural areas.
Food and Beverages are primarily shipped by truck. According to the
Freight Analysis Framework, almost 90% are transported by truck, with rail
being the second most popular mode with about 7-10% modal share.
Food and Beverages commodity group is among the products that are
usually shipped in small quantities; the average number of carloads per waybill
varied from 1.24 in 2003 to 1.37 in 2014. Hopper and tank cars are most
commonly used to move products in this commodity group. The average load
per car in the CWS is about 90 tons, and the average distance traveled is
about 1050 miles. The average revenue per ton-mile grew from $0.036 in 2003
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Figure 1.24: Food and Beverages Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
to $0.058 in 2013. Ton-miles per year were growing until 2010 and slightly
declined after that. Total market revenue was almost constantly increasing
from 2003 to 2014 primarily due to price increases. Total commodity revenue
increased from $2 to $3.8 billion dollars from 2003 to 2014. Figure 1.24 shows
how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and revenue per
ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal to one in
2003.
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1.3.7 Grains and Feeds
Grains and feeds commodity group includes STCC 0113 and 01144,
grains (wheat, corn, oats, sorghum, etc.) and soybeans respectively. Non-
organic corn, wheat, and soybeans are the most common products shipped
with the volume of 48.5, 27.6, and 21.7 million tons respectively. According
to USDA3, corn is mostly consumed domestically; its primary use is as animal
feed. A significant fraction of the U.S. wheat is exported. The exports of corn
are high as well.
Figure 1.25: Grains and Feeds Rail Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.25 shows the origin of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
Shipments mostly originated in Midwest and Northwest. According to USDA4,
3U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and
Distribution.
4U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agriculture Statistics Service, 2002 Census
of Agriculture
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Figure 1.26: Grains and Feeds Rail Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
approximately two-thirds of U.S. corn is produced in the ”Corn Belt” states
of Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Indiana. U.S. wheat production is
concentrated in the northern and central plains.
Figure 1.26 shows termination of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
Destination locations are spread around the country with clusters around ex-
port facilities.
Grains and feed are primarily shipped by truck. Rail is the second most
populous mode of transportation with about 20% modal share. Freight in this
commodity group is sometimes shipped in unit trains to reduce the cost of
shipment. In recent years railroad companies have been increasingly pushing
shippers to use unit trains. The share of trains with 100 or more carloads in
CWS in grains and feed commodity group had increased from 3.9% in 2003
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Figure 1.27: Grains and Feeds Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
to 9.4% in 2014. Hopper cars are most commonly used to move grains and
feed. The average load per car in the CWS is about 100 tons, and the average
distance traveled is about 900 miles. The average revenue per ton-mile grew
from $0.032 in 2003 to $0.053 in 2014. Ton-miles per year were growing until
2006, and have been declining since then. Total market revenue has not been
falling much due to the increased price per ton-mile shipped. Figure 1.27 shows
how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and revenue per
ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal to one in
2003.
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1.3.8 Metals and Minerals
Metals and minerals commodity group includes 2-digit STCC codes
10, 14, 32, 33, 34. These include metallic ores (all metallic ores, such as iron,
copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, bauxite or aluminum, manganese, tungsten,
and chromium ores), crushed stone, sand and gravel, nonmetallic minerals
(clay, phosphate rock, rock salt, etc.), stone, clay and glass products, metals
and products (galvanized, and fabricated metal products).
Figure 1.28: Metals and Minerals Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.28 shows the origin of rail shipments by county and tonnage.
Figure 1.29 shows termination of rail shipments by county and tonnage. Both
origin and destination locations are spread around the country. Texas and
Wisconsin are two leaning states in terms of tonnage both originated, and
Texas and Ohio lead by terminated tons. Texas originated 27 million tons and
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Figure 1.29: Metals and Minerals Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
terminated 61 million tons in 2014, while Wisconsin originated 21, and Ohio
terminated 17 million tons.
Metals and minerals are primarily shipped by truck. Rail is the second
most populous mode of transportation with about 5-10% modal share. Freight
in this commodity group is sometimes shipped in multiple carloads but rarely
in unit trains. The average number of carloads per waybill from 2003 to 2014
was about 2.5. Box, gondola, Hopper, and Flat cars are most commonly used
to move metals and minerals. The average load per car in the CWS is about
95 tons, and the average distance traveled is about 650 miles. The average
revenue per ton-mile grew from $0.049 in 2003 to $0.065 in 2014. Ton-miles
per year dropped during the recession, but have recovered since. Total market
revenue has grown from $2.6 billion in 2003 to $5.9 billion in 2014. Figure
1.30 shows how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and
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Figure 1.30: Metals and Minerals Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-
2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
revenue per ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal
to one in 2003.
1.3.9 Intermodal
Intermodal shipments are defined as shipments in rail trailer-on-flatcar
(TOFC) and container-on-flatcar (COFC). TOFC is a practice of loading an
over the highway truck trailers onto a specialized railway flatcar; it is the most
basic form of intermodal transportation. COFC incorporates loading a ship-
ping container onto a flat car. The popularity of COFC has been growing
over the past years. Railroads have been developing infrastructure to incor-
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porate double-stacking, where each flat car can carry two layers of intermodal
containers. Intermodal containers carry a wide variety of products. The vast
majority of movements (over 60%) are recorded as miscellaneous mixed ship-
ments. Other shipments include containerized imported and exported goods
and reverse flow of trailers and containers.
Figure 1.31: Intermodal Tonnage by Origin County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figures 1.31 and 1.32 shows origins and terminations of rail shipments
by county and tonnage. Both origin and termination locations are spread
around the country with major clusters around seaports. The majority of
intermodal traffic travels to or from California, Illinois, Texas, and Georgia.
Intermodal shipments are always billed as single-carload shipments,
even multiple containers or trailers are placed by a shipper on the same train
to the same destination. Therefore, I cannot observe trends in shipment size
39
Figure 1.32: Intermodal Tonnage by Termination County, 2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.33: Intermodal Revenue, Ton-Miles, and RTM Trends, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
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other than tons per carload. The average load per car in the CWS is about
14 tons, and the average distance traveled is about 1400 miles. The average
revenue per ton-mile grew from $0.056 in 2003 to $0.083 in 2014. Ton-miles
per year dropped during the recession, but have recovered since. Total market
revenue had grown from $8.6 billion in 2003 to $15.9 billion in 2014. Figure
1.33 shows how total revenue in the commodity group, ton-miles shipped and
revenue per ton-mile changes over the years. Variables are normalized to equal
to one in 2003.
1.4 Rail Rates: Tariffs and Contracts
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was established in 1887.
Initially, it was created to regulate the rates that railroads charged shippers and
ensure that the rates were reasonable. Later, ICC’s authority was expanded to
regulate other modes of commerce, such as interstate bus and telephone com-
panies. By 1970s, the freight railroad industry reached an economic slowdown.
The costs were rising, and it became harder to compete with motor carriers.
The railroads were losing share to other modes of transportation and could not
easily adjust their rates and capital structure. A series of bankruptcies have
hit the industry as a result. To revive freight traffic and make railroads more
competitive the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 were executed. These laws substantially
deregulated the industry and gave railroads flexibility in setting rates. Af-
ter the deregulation companies were able to use differentiated pricing and set
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rates according to the competitive environment. Additionally, railroads and
shippers now could enter into confidential contracts to set terms and rates.
In 1995 ICC was terminated and transferred its regulatory functions to newly
created Surface Transportation Board (STB). The STB has been serving as
the freight railroad industry economic regulator since then.
The STB has a broad economic, regulatory oversight of freight railroad
companies. It resolves rate and service disputes, oversees carrier mergers and
interchange of traffic among carriers. After rate deregulation, STB established
a process to protect ”captive” shippers from unreasonably high rates, a process
that is often called a ”rate-relief” process. Captive shippers are the shippers
served by only one railroad with no competitive shipping alternatives.
Commodities that can be easily shipped by other modes of transporta-
tion, such as a barge or a truck, were later exempted from STB’s jurisdiction.
The primary reason for the exemption was that these commodities are un-
likely to be captive. These are the commodities that could be shipped by
boxcar or intermodal containers. According to a Department of Agriculture
report, these exemptions, in addition to contracts, effectively freed about 75
to 85 percent of freight traffic from economic regulation by STB. Currently,
the most frequently transported commodities that could be subject to STB
rate regulation, by tons shipped, are grains and feed, assorted food items, coal,
chemicals, and nonmetallic minerals.
Freight railroads can set rates through tariffs or contracts. Contracts
are confidential agreements between the railroad and a shipper, and contain
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mutually agreed upon rates for specific routes and other service terms for a
specific shipper. Contracts are usually shipper specific and confidential, while
tariffs are set for a given route and can be relatively simply found on major
company’s websites. Upon request, railroads are required to offer tariff rates
to any shipper. STB only has the authority to review the tariff rates.
The STB resolves disputes regarding the rates or terms in a tariff under
rate-relief process. It can only review the rates that were not set under the
contract, and the commodity in question is not exempt from rate regulation,
and the railroad has a ”market dominance.” FIt should be proven that the
rate exceeds 180 percent of the railroad’s variable cost using pre-established
cost calculation routine; and that no potential competition from railroads or
other modes of transportation exists.
In the cases when the rate was shown to be unreasonable, STB may
intervene and order the railroad to pay reparations to the shipper. According
to United States Government Accountability Office (2016) (GAO), between
1996 and 2016, STB reviewed 50 rate reasonableness cases. 32 out of 50 cases
were for shipments of coal, and 16 for chemicals. About half of the cases were
settled before STB intervention, and 11 cases were decided in favor of shippers
by STB, and 10 in favor of railroads.
GAO interviewed representatives of the four largest Class I railroads
and found that railroads similarly set both rates and tariffs. They examine
market factors, such as competition from other forms of transportation, i.e.,
truck, barge, competition from other railroads, and how much shippers are
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willing to pay. Both tariffs and rates are usually specific to a commodity
group and geographic market. GAO found that the contracts are usually no
longer than 1 to 5 years, and typically include periodic rate adjustments.
Previous literature (MacDonald (1987), Eakin et al. (2008)) highlighted
that characteristics such as car ownership, length of haul and number of car-
loads might influence freight railroad rates. To show this, I present revenue
per ton-miles trends for coal and grains and feeds commodity groups.
Figure 1.34: Coal Rates by Car Ownership, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
A shipper can own a freight car or lease it from a railroad company.
Private cars are those that are not directly owned by the railroad company
and include cars owned by shippers or leased by shippers from independent car
companies. Private car ownership in coal commodity group has been growing
significantly over the years from about 27% in 2003 to 67% in 2014. However,
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Figure 1.35: Grains and Feeds Rates by Car Ownership, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
it dropped in grains and feed from 40% to 30%. Figures 1.34 and 1.35 show
the trend in rates for the two commodity groups. Using a privately owned car
to ships goods in both commodity groups results in a lower rate on average.
However, the discount is much higher for coal. The average price of a shipment
in a private car was almost twice as cheap as in a railroad supplied the car.
This result should be considered with caution, as private car ownership may be
correlated with other factors that influence the price, for example, the number
of cars in a waybill.
Moving many cars on the same train from a single commodity to a single
destination without a need to rearrange the cars helps railroad companies
reduce the cost of the haul. In turn, railroad companies provide a discount
to the shippers that can aggregate the shipments into unit trains. The use of
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Figure 1.36: Coal Rates by Number of Carloads, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
Figure 1.37: Grains and Feeds Rates by Number of Carloads, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
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unit trains has been steadily increasing over the years. The share of waybills
with over 50 carloads of grains and feed in 2003 was 13%, while it increased to
16% in 2014. Coal has seen an even more rapid increase. In 2003 only about
21% of waybills had over 50 carloads, while in 2014 almost 90% of freight
was moved this way. Figures 1.36 and 1.37 show the trend in rates for the
two commodity groups. Single indicates waybills with less than five carloads;
multicar indicates waybills with 5-49 cars, and unit indicate waybills with 50
carloads and more. The rate difference between single and multicar waybills
is not significant, while unit trains seem to provide quantity discounts in both
coal and grains and feed commodity groups.
Figure 1.38: Coal Rates by Distance, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
The third shipment characteristic of interest is distance. Due to the
economies of scale, and costly loading and unloading, it is usually cheaper to
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Figure 1.39: Grains and Feeds Rates by Distance, 2003-2014
Source: STB Carload Waybill Sample
ship freight on longer distances. Figures 1.38 and 1.39 show the trend in rates
for the two commodity groups. Short indicates all shipments for the distance
less than 500 miles, medium - 500 miles to 1000 miles, long - over 1000 mile.
It is clear that for both commodity groups rates on longer-distance shipments
are on average lower per ton-mile than rates on shorter-distance shipments.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided a broad overview of the U.S. freight
railroad industry, discussed major railroad companies, dynamics in the com-
modity markets, and the rate-setting process. It is essential to understand the
heterogeneity of the commodities that are shipped by freight railroads to be
able to conduct a proper economic analysis in the following chapters. There
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have been major structural exogenous shifts in the demand for freight rail-
road services from 2003 to 2014. Intermodal, automotive products, metals
and minerals, and construction and forest products commodity groups have
seen a decline in the ton-miles of freight originated in 2009 due to economic
crises. Some of them have fully recovered since the recession; some are still
on a recovery path. Coal shipments have declined due to the Clean Air Act;
coal production has also shifted from Appalachia region to Powder River Basin
due to regulations limiting sulfur dioxide emissions. Energy products and fuels
commodity group has been profoundly affected by the shale oil boom. Ship-
ments of oil by train doubled from 2010 to 2014. These exogenous shocks to




Tragedy of the Anticommons in
Complementary-Good Markets
2.1 Introduction
There were 33 class I railroads in the 1980s, and there are only seven
today. This process of consolidation came to at least a temporary end at
the turn of the 21st century. The consolidation stopped when the Surface
Transportation Board (STB), the regulator in the freight railroad industry,
faced with the first proposal to form a transcontinental railroad in the U.S., the
proposed end-to-end merger of BNSF with CN. STB first imposed a temporary
freeze on Class I rail mergers, and then issued new merger guidelines that
significantly increased the burden of proof on merging parties to demonstrate
that the merger would be in public interest.
As of today, there is no single transcontinental railroad company, and a
shipper that needs to move goods from the east coast to the west coast would
have to use the services of multiple railroads, and therefore, purchase perfect
complements. It had been recognized more than 150 years ago by Ellet (1839)
that when segments of road or railway are owned by independent companies,
it creates a complementary oligopoly.
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The effects of such a market structure were first studied by Cournot
(1838). He showed that both profit and efficiency are higher under integrated
monopoly than a complimentary oligopoly. Later, the welfare effect of com-
plementary monopoly has been analyzed by a number of researchers including
Economides et al. (1991) who extend the Cournot complementary monopoly
to a duopolistic setting. Theoretical literature and models continued to de-
velop, with research by Lemley and Shapiro (2006), Lerner and Tirole (2015),
Rey and Salant (2012), and others trying to unpack the effects of the ”tragedy
of anticommons” and analyze if firms can reach Pareto improvement in setting
rates without intervention by a regulator. The analysis has been extended to
the literature on double marginalization, royalty stacking in intellectual prop-
erty literature, patents, and others. See, for example, Heller (1998), Heller
and Eisenberg (1998), and Buchanan and Yoon (2000), with most of the work
being specifically about patents.
A number of studies evaluate the welfare effect of airline alliances1.
Early research indicated that fairs in interlined markets fall due to the ease
of cooperation and elimination of double marginalization. However, multiple
studies find that code-sharing can lead to increased prices on non-stop parallel
routes. Armantier and Richard (2006), Gilo and Simonelli (2014) find that
fares are significantly higher on nonstop code-shared flights as compared to
1Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2011), Bilotkach and Hüschelrath (2013), Oum et al. (1996),
Park (1997), Brueckner (2001), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Heimer and Shy (2006),
Bilotkach (2005), Bilotkach (2007b), Bilotkach (2007a), Barla and Constantatos (2006),
Chen and Gayle (2007), Flores-Fillol and Moner-Colonques (2007)
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the flights offered by non-allied companies. Gilo and Simonelli suggest that
because codesharing airlines can more easily coordinate in setting fares and
have more opportunity to punish the party deviating from collusive agreement,
alliances may ease collusion in all the markets that they serve together. This
will benefits interline passengers, but would harm those traveling on routes
where airlines compete.
Freight railroads own the infrastructure they operate on, including
tracks, and therefore, most of the time, the owner of the tracks is the sole
operator on the line. There are two geographical duopolies, one in the East
and one in the West, and a couple of other companies that offer routes in
the northern part of the U.S. and Canada, along Mississippi River, and in
the South and Mexico. No merger proposal has been submitted to the freight
railroad industry regulator since the 2000s. However, some of the railroad in-
dustry experts are convinced that the industry will become even more consol-
idated. Hunter Harrison, a former CEO of Canadian Pacific Railway, stated
that the ”final round of mergers is not a question of if, but when.” While
Linda Morgan, the head of the Surface Transportation Board in 2000, wrote
that ”While mergers have their place, recent events have shown that no major
merger takes place in isolation, and that, once a round of mergers begins, it can
be all-consuming, distracting, and disruptive, to the detriment of the nation’s
transportation system, rail shippers, rail employees, and communities across
the country.” Therefore, it is essential to understand the welfare implications
of this consolidation, and which mergers should be allowed by the regulator
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and which blocked.
In 2016 CP submitted a bid to acquire NS. The combined network
would connect Vancouver, B.C., and the East and Gulf coasts of the United
States, enhancing options around the gridlock of Chicago and potentially re-
moving inefficiency from the pricing of complements. The proposal faced a
wall of opposition. STB has received dozens of letters from shippers, law-
makers, and other railroads. Union Pacific Railroad CEO Lance Fritz called
blocking the deal ”job 1” for his railway and the industry at large. Competing
railroads may have the incentive to block the merger because they are afraid of
vertical exclusion, or because it may result in more substantial head-to-head
competition on the routes where CP and NS interline. The increase in compe-
tition happens because, by merging, complementary firms remove the negative
pricing externality and become more aggressive competitors to the substitute
firm.
The Journal of Commerce2 analyzed more than 100 letters written to
STB by industry participants after CP submitted a bid to acquire NS. They
found that shippers of agriculture and metal products backed the potential tie-
up, while UPS, FedEx, and other significant logistics players opposed the deal.
Auto and energy product shippers were split. Letters cite several reasons why
the merger would be in the public interest. They frequently refer to the issues
of Chicago congestion, the opportunity to create reliable single-line service that
2Hutchins (2016)
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runs from the west coast in Canada to the eastern U.S., improved customer
service, and reducing highway congestion.
Remarks by BNSF and UP hint that CP-NS merger is likely to spell
another round of consolidation. ”We’ve never in this industry just done one
merger,” Matt Rose, BNSF executive chairman, said according to a Bloomberg
report. ”You do a merger and then somebody else announces it because of
this issue of stabilization of the industry and parity in various markets.”
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the welfare implications
of the next round of consolidation in the freight railroad industry. By esti-
mating a structural model of demand and supply in the industry, I am able
to conduct merger simulations between different pairs of railroads; find a sce-
nario that results in the highest welfare; understand who gains and looses the
most: shippers, merging parties, or outsiders; and decompose the effects on
consumers by commodity.
In recent years, a considerable amount of interest on the part of the An-
titrust agencies in the U.S. and the EU has been devoted non-horizontal merg-
ers. Both U.S. and EU agencies have established guidelines for non-horizontal
mergers where they distinguish two broad types of mergers: vertical and con-
glomerate. It has been the norm in the U.S. to use the tools of vertical mergers
to evaluate complementary product mergers3, while EU treats mergers involv-
ing suppliers of complementary products as conglomerate mergers. Although
3For example, Northrop Grumman/TRW, GE/Avio, and Live Nation/TicketMaster each
could be characterized as complementary product mergers.
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antitrust laws are phrased differently in the two regions, and sometimes have
conflicting opinions on merger proposals4, antitrust laws in the U.S. and across
the Atlantic generally pursue the same objectives.
Antitrust agencies have long recognized removal of double - marginal-
ization or internalization of pricing inefficiency in case of complementary goods
mergers. For example, Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T mergers were approved
by the Department of Justice in 2005. The pairs of firms were engaged in com-
plementary activities: long distance and local telecommunication services. A
significant factor in DOJ’s decision not to challenge the proposed mergers was
that the mergers were likely to produce substantial efficiencies. The merging
long distance carriers (AT&T and MCI) have generally relied on local carriers
(SBC and Verizon) for customer access. The merger allowed these firms to
provide the products at a lower cost to the consumers by internalizing pricing
inefficiency.
Antitrust authorities understand that vertical integration and conglom-
erate merger can solve the problem of inefficient pricing of complements and
benefit consumers. However, they also recognize other factors should be taken
into account. For example, the in Comcast/NBCU competitive impact state-
ment DOJ concluded: ”much, if not all, of any potential double marginaliza-
tion is reduced, if not completely eliminated, through the course of contract
negotiations.” Both U.S. and EU antitrust agencies have considered other po-
4GE and Honeywell proposed to merge in 2000, the firms were producing complements.
The deal was approved in the U.S., but was blocked by the EU Competition Directorate.
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tential effects such as foreclosure, tying and bundling, and entry deterrence.
Another substantial anticompetitive effect of a merger is that, with fewer play-
ers on the market, the probability of collusion between them increases. This
dissertation will address this aspect in the next chapter.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a theoretical background of complementary monopoly. Section 3 defines
markets and describes primary data sources used in the analysis. Section 4
provides a brief reduced form analysis as evidence of double marginalization
in the freight railroad industry. The structural model is estimated in section
5, and merger simulations as a part of the counterfactual analysis is performed
in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 Complementary Monopoly
A complementary monopoly refers to a market setting where a differ-
ent monopolist produces each of the complementary goods. These goods are
only demanded in bundles, at equal quantities, and there is no demand for
each good by itself. This model was first studied in Cournot (1838)5. He
showed that both profit and efficiency are higher under integrated monopoly,
where a single firm offers complements forming a composite good than under
a complementary monopoly. This is often referred to as the ”tragedy of the
5Sonnenschein (1968) formalized Cournot’s arguments and showed that Cournot duopoly
is the dual of this complementary monopoly.
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anticommons” or ”double-marginalization.” In his discussion vertical and com-
plementary monopoly, Tirole (1988), states, “What is worse than a monopoly?
A chain of monopolies.”6
In the setting of complementary monopoly, consumers only care about
the combined price of a bundle, which makes demands for the complements
interrelated. A firm producing a single good takes into account only the impact
of a price rise on its own profits, without considering the negative externality
imposed on the sellers of other complementary goods. Each seller earns the
full benefit of an increase in the price of his good but bears only part of the
cost associated with a reduction in the quantity demanded due to the price
increase. The externality problem generates a prisoners’ dilemma among the
suppliers of complementary goods. As a result, prices will be higher with
separate producers than with an integrated monopolist, generating a lower
consumer surplus and profits.
To better understand the nature of this inefficiency, consider a simple
textbook example from Pepall et al. (2014). There are two goods that are
perfect complements, i.e., consuming one without another gives zero utility.
Suppose that the demand function for the composite good is
Q = A− (P1 + P2) (2.1)
6While he refers specifically to a vertical arrangement where one monopolist controls an
input to be sold to another monopolist for use in the production of a final good, he points
out that the statement is also true for two monopolists producing complementary goods to
be consumed in fixed proportions.
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where P1 is the price of good 1, and P2 is the price of good 2. Equation 3.1
represents separate demands that each monopolist faces because consumers
only buy two goods together. Therefore, Q1 = Q2 = Q. The change in the
price of a good one not only changes the quantity demanded of a good one
but also of good two. This implies that each firm’s pricing decision has profit
implications for both firms.
Let the marginal cost of production of good 1 and 2 be c1 and c2
respectively. Each firm chooses price to maximize their profit
max
Pi
(Pi − ci)(A− Pi − Pj) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i (2.2)
Maximization yields
Pi =
A+ ci − Pj
2
(2.3)
Jointly solving for both goods yields equilibrium prices:
Pi =
A+ 2ci − cj
3
(2.4)
And the price of composite good is
P 0 = P1 + P2 =
2A+ c1 + c2
3
(2.5)
From the demand equation 3.1, the number of units of composite good con-
sumed is
Q0 =
A− c1 − c2
3
(2.6)
The combined profit of both firms is
π0 = π1 + π2 =
2
9
(A− c1 − c2)2 (2.7)
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(A− c1 − c2)2 (2.8)
Now consider a situation when the two firms merge and the newly
combined firm sells a bundled product (combination of goods 1 and 2). Such
a firm faces the joint demand curve 3.1 and recognizes that the relevant price
to consumers is the combined price of two goods. Because goods are only
consumed in one-to-one ratio, there is no point of selling goods independently.
The prices of individual components of the bundle are non identifiable. The




(P − c1 − c2)(A− P ) (2.9)
This yields
P 1 =
A+ c1 + c2
2
(2.10)
Substituting price back to the demand equation
Q1 =
A− c1 − c2
2
(2.11)




(A− c1 − c2)2 (2.12)




(A− c1 − c2)2 (2.13)
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(2A+ c1 + c2)
1
2
(A+ c1 + c2)
1
2
(A− c1 − c2)
Q 1
3
(A− c1 − c2) 12(A− c1 − c2) −
1
6
(A− c1 − c2)
π 2
9
(A− c1 − c2)2 14(A− c1 − c2)
2 − 1
36
(A− c1 − c2)2
CS 1
18
(A− c1 − c2)2 18(A− c1 − c2)
2 − 5
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(A− c1 − c2)2
Table 2.1 provides a comparison of combined price, quantity, profits and
customer surplus for the two cases. The comparison reveals that the merger
of the two firms leads to lower prices and higher quantity consumed. This is
because the merged firm understands the interaction of demand between the
two products. As a result of this coordination, consumers are made better off
— the consumer surplus increases due to the price reduction. Additionally, the
combined profit is higher in the case of monopoly; this is because independent
firms price inefficiently high. This was Cournot’s main point, by internalizing
the interdependence of demand for two goods, the firms can remove inefficiency
from pricing complements, and as a result, both consumers and producers gain.
Though it should be noted that this is a second-best result. The combined
price exceeds the optimal price that is equal to the marginal cost.
A merger is not the only way to achieve efficiency gains in complemen-
tary monopoly markets. Other forms of coordination can be established to
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take better account of the interactions between demands for complementary
goods. For example, airline codesharing agreements 7 (Brueckner and Whalen
(2000), Brueckner (2003), Ito and Lee (2005)), alliances in supply chains (Stal-
lkamp (2001) discusses alliances formations among auto part suppliers, patent
pooling (Shapiro (2001), Lampe and Moser (2010)). Moreover, firms do not
necessarily have to form formal agreements. If firms are repeatedly interacting,
they may be able to sustain tacit collusion and remove negative externality
from double marginalization.
2.2.2 Competition within Complementary Goods
The section above describes negative externality that arises from pric-
ing perfect complements and how a coordinated price setting or merger can
eliminate it. It primarily relies on the assumption of monopoly in comple-
ments’ markets. However, if the competition is introduced, the results may
not hold any longer. Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2006) investigate the impact
of competition on welfare in complementary goods markets. They find that
two substitutes per component are sufficient to reach welfare improvements
equivalent to the ones of a merger when firms choose to price a la Bertrand.
However, when firms choose the quantity, the availability of substitutes, re-
gardless of their number, is ineffective.
Assume that there are multiple producers of good 1 that produce ho-
7Codesharing is a contractual agreement among airlines under which the ”ticketing car-
rier” is allowed to market and sell seats on its partner’s flights.
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mogeneous goods. In this case, the price in market 1 would fall to marginal
cost. Each firm there would be so small that it would not be able to impose
any external effects on the monopoly of market 2. Plugging P1 = c1 into best
response equation 2.3 for firm 2, yields P2 = (A + c2 − c1)/2. In this setting,
the seller of good 2 can extract higher rents. Although the price of good 2
is higher, the total combined price of two goods is equal to the price under
monopoly, P = (A+ c1 + c2)/2. Therefore, the welfare implications of adding
competition in one of the complementary goods markets result in the same
welfare effects as a merger. If both markets were to become competitive, then
both good 1 and 2 would be priced at marginal cost. This would result in
the highest welfare, and all the surplus would be attributed to the consumers,
firms would collect zero profits.
Economides et al. (1991) compare equilibrium prices and welfare effects
under different ownership when two differentiated brands of each of two com-
ponents of a good are offered. They contrast joint, parallel, and independent
ownership. Under joint ownership, a single firm produces all components. The
authors assume that under parallel vertical integration price discrimination or
vertical exclusion is not allowed; thus consumers that purchase both compo-
nents from the same firm cannot be favored. They find that prices are always
lower in parallel vertical integration than in independent ownership. However,
the welfare effect of full integration is ambiguous. The prices are lower un-
der the joint ownership than parallel vertical integration when two composite
goods are highly differentiated. If goods are moderate substitutes, prices are
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higher under full integration than under parallel vertical integration but lower
than under independent ownership. For very close substitutes, full integration
results in a price even higher than independent ownership.
Quint (2014) considers a model of imperfect competition with hetero-
geneous preferences. In the model, three coal mines supply coal to a city. Each
mine is connected to the city by an independent railroad. Buyers can choose
to purchase coal from any of the three coal mines or be without coal. The
buyer that chooses to purchase coal pays the price of coal to the mine and the
cost of transport to the railroad. The author models demand for coal using
a discrete choice model with heterogeneous preferences. He derives sufficient
conditions under which a merger between a mine and a railroad serving the
mine would lead to lower equilibrium prices, while a merger between two of
the railroads would lead to higher prices for everyone.
Another interesting market setting was considered by Anderson et al.
(2010). They present a model under which mergers increase consumer surplus,
and decrease profits of non-merging firms in the market. In this model of airline
competition, the passengers can travel from point A to point B using either a
direct flight with airline 0 or a flight with one stop on airlines 1 and 2. Authors
show that a merger between airline 1 and 2 always harms airline 0, and benefits
consumers. This is because by merging, firms selling complementary products
entirely internalize the inefficiency and reduce the price of the interlined flight.
As a result, competing firm faces a more aggressive competitor and has to
decrease its markups.
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To sum up, the theoretical literature on complementary goods pricing
has been vast, highlighting the negative externality that arises from demand
interdependence. The most common way proposed in the literature to correct
for this inefficiency is the internalization of demand interdependence with the
help of merger, alliance, or other cooperative agreements. Researchers ana-
lyzed multiple market structures and found that the welfare effects of mergers
can be ambiguous, especially if they decrease competition among substitutes.
Vertical mergers among producers of complementary goods are usually associ-
ated with increased consumer surplus and welfare, while, under some market
structure, firms’ profit would decrease due to the merger.
2.3 Industry Overview
2.3.1 Market Definition
The starting point of conducting competitive analysis is the definition
of relevant markets. Railroads’ product is the transportation of goods between
specific origin-destination pairs. Therefore, to define the markets one needs
to choose a scope of geographic areas for origin-destination pairs as well as
relevant commodity groups.
I define a market as a unidirectional movement of freight between ori-
gin and destination Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Economic Areas in
a particular year for a given commodity group. Each BEA area consists of
a center node - Component Economic Area (metropolitan, combined or mi-
cropolitan statistical area) and the surrounding counties that are economically
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related to it. The BEA areas cover the entire United States. Figure 2.1 shows
BEA areas on the U.S. map. The rationale for using broader geographic areas
as origin and destination points is that shipper can benefit from the presence
of a competing railroad even if it does not serve the shipper’s exact location,
for example, shippers can employ truck transloading to access a railroad. A
customer can in some cases threaten to or actually build out a rail spur to
access an alternative rail carrier. Further details and examples can be found
in Grimm and Plaistow (1999). Additionally, BEA-BEA market definition
follows that of the Justice Department in the Santa Fe - Southern Pacific and
Union Pacific - Southern Pacific merger cases, and Pittman (1990).
I group commodities into nine commodity groups. The goods were
grouped based on the Standard Transportation Commodity Codes (STCC)
and equipment required to move the goods. These groups roughly correspond
to major railroads’ lines of business. Freight in different groups is likely to
be shipped by very different customers that are unlikely to have identical
price sensitivity, and railroads may possess a different degree of market power
across the groups. Requiring different equipment to transport and load the
goods means that the cost structure is different as well. See section 1.3 for
more details about commodity groups. Table 2.2 lists the commodity groups,
their description, the share of revenue, tonnage and ton-miles in 2014 CWS,
and most common car types used to transport the goods in the group. The
included commodity groups represent nearly 98 percent of tonnage, ton-miles,
and revenue in the 2014 CWS.
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Figure 2.1: BEA Economic Areas
In terms of tons originated, coal represents the most significant propor-
tion of railroad shipments, about 40%. Chemicals, metals and minerals, and
intermodal shipments (containers and truck trailers) are also relatively large
categories in terms of tons originated. Examining the proportions of railroad
revenues by commodity group, coal is now the second largest category, reflect-
ing its low-value bulk commodity status. The intermodal shipments category
represented only 11% of 2014 tons originated but accounted for 25.7% of rail-
road revenues. This is a consequence of the high value of intermodal railroad
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2.9% 2.3% 2.3% Box and Flat
Energy Products
& Fuels
4.0% 3.2% 3.7% Tanks Cars
Food & Beverages 6.3% 5.3% 5.8%
Hopper
and Tank
Grains & Feed 6.8% 6.5% 7.8% Hopper Cars
Metals & Minerals 10.3% 16.3% 8.2%
Box, Gondola,
Hopper, Flat
Intermodal 25.7% 11.0% 18.4% TOFC/COFC
services.
2.3.2 Data description
STB Carload Waybill Sample
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The primary source of data is unmasked confidential STB Carload Way-
bill Sample (CWS) for the years 2003 through 2014. The sample is a collection
of railroad waybill records submitted to the STB by rail carriers that terminate
4,500 or more revenue carloads annually. It is roughly a 3% stratified sample
of shipment level observations which is then expanded to represent 100% of
all rail traffic. The sample includes information about the origin and destina-
tion of shipment, distance of haul, goods transported, their weight, railroads
participating in the movement, revenue collected etc8. The main advantage of
the unmasked CWS is that it provides actual revenue data reflecting tariff or
contract rates at the level of shipment, which is unavailable from other sources
of railroad operating statistics.
I screen the data to remove anomalous observations and outliers. I
only keep shipments originating and terminating outside of 48 contiguous U.S.
states. I exclude waybills with unusually heavy and light average tons per car,
very high numbers of carloads on the waybill, very short shipment distances,
and zero revenue. Most of the U.S. freight railroad systems are approved
for the heavy axle rail cars that can handle up to 315,000 lbs. gross weight,
therefore, I trim maximum tons per car at 315,000 lbs. I exclude waybills
with more than 150 carloads, the maximum number of carloads in a unit train
according to the guidelines of the major railroads. I also exclude observations
with the distance under 100 miles. To estimate the structural model, I select
8A small percentage of interlined traffic in CWS was rebilled: reported as two separate
shipments. These shipments were linked back together using a procedure described in the
Appendix.
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markets with at least 1500 carloads a year. CWS lacks meaningful micro-level
data and does not include information about the shippers or receivers of the
freight. I, therefore, aggregate it to a product level data set. I define a product
as a shipment of goods in a commodity group by a railroad or a combination
of railroads. All other characteristics of the product are averaged over the
shipments. I drop products that do not represent competitive presence in the
market and carry less than 2% of the market railroad tonnage.
Table 2.3 presents sample sizes, number of geographic markets, the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































I use Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) database version 4 to estimate
market size - tons of freight of a given commodity hauled between origin and
destination BEA areas. FAF is produced jointly by the Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics and Federal Highway Administration. It integrates data from
a variety of sources to create a comprehensive picture of freight movement
among major metropolitan areas by all modes of transportation. Railroads
compete with trucks, barges, and pipelines to transport commodities and fin-
ished goods. Due to the nature of goods and volumes that are handled, the
main competitors for rail in the domestic freight segment are trucks and to a
lesser extent, barges and pipeline. As railroads are more fuel efficient, demand
is also driven by fuel prices. High gas prices shift freight transport from truck
to rail. Between 2011 and 2012, a period of rising gasoline prices, ton-miles
carried by trucks dropped by about 30%, while ton-miles carried by rail did
not change significantly (see figure 2.2).
Figure 2.3 provides a share of each mode of transportation by com-
modity group for the entire United States in 2014, and figure 2.4 shows modal
shares by the distance of haul. The share of rail in the total freight flow varies
with the commodity group and distance. Speed and flexibility give truckers
an advantage on short routes, while rails have the upper hand on long hauls
and carrying bulk freight, such as coal.
Additionally, I use the National Transportation Atlas Database pub-
lished by Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and R-1 Railroad Annual Re-
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Figure 2.2: U.S total ton-miles of freight by mode (in Billions)
Figure 2.3: Modal Share by Commodity Group in 2014
ports from Financial & Statistical Reports published by Surface Transporta-
tion Board to construct instrumental variables, which are discussed later. I
also use Statistics of U.S. Businesses to proxy for shipper size in demand esti-
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Figure 2.4: Modal Share by Distance in Miles in 2014
mation of the structural model.
2.3.3 Analysis of Revenue Over Variable Cost
When STB resolves disputes regarding freight tariffs it analyses the
ratio of rate to the variable cost of providing the service, it is called revenue-
to-variable cost ratio (RVC). A rate higher than 180% of RVC is subject to
a potential STB review, given other conditions hold (for more details see sec-
tion 1.4). RVC is calculated using the variable cost measure derived from the
Uniform Rail Costing System (URCS). URCS was adopted in 1989, and it uti-
lizes a mix of accounting and statistical procedures to estimate the cost of a
particular shipment. URCS inputs reported cost information into a computer
program to provide estimates of the variable cost based on observable cost
characteristics. According to Rhodes and Westbrook (1986) ”In the URCS,
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variable costs for specific freight movements are calculated as weighted av-
erages of total costs from individual cost categories that comport with cost
categories defined in railroad accounting practices” (p. 290). For more de-
tailed description of URCS see Rhodes and Westbrook (1986), Wilson and
Bitzan (2003), Wilson and Wolak (2016).
URCS and measure of RVC have been criticized by recent research in
the field for not representing a cost measure that a profit-maximizing firm
would use to set the price. Wilson and Wolak (2016) note that ”URCS is a
methodology for allocating rail costs to individual shipments rather than a
method for measuring the increase in the railroad’s costs caused by a ship-
ment.” While this criticism is fair, I believe that RVC can serve as a good
measure for descriptive evidence of differences in markups across the markets.
The measure of variable cost from URCS would account for observable market
differences, like products shipped, distance, geography, and allow us to com-
pare ”markups” across the markets. I put quotes around markups because
RVC does not represent the true markups that are measured using marginal
cost.
Table 2.4: Revenue-to-Variable Cost Ratio by Origin and Termination Rail-
road in 2003
BNSF UP CSXT NS
BNSF 1.325 1.946 2.040 2.143 1.869 1.867 1.408
UP 2.102 1.940 1.481 2.097 1.636 2.244 1.767
CSXT 1.543 1.891 1.680 1.633 1.415 1.918 2.268
NS 1.266 1.515 1.567 1.771 2.192 1.854 1.171
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Table 2.4 provides average RVC by origin and termination railroad for
the four largest railroads in 2003. Here row indicates the origin and column
termination. Left input is RVC of originating railroad, right is of terminating.
For example, in the waybills where BNSF originates the freight movement, and
CSXT terminates, RVC of BNSF is 2.143 and RVC of CSXT is 1.869. Notice,
that for each railroad RVC is always smaller when there is no interline (same
origin and termination railroad) than in the cases with an interline. This pro-
vides descriptive evidence of the inefficiency from the pricing of complements.
2.4 Reduced Form Analysis
One may argue that firms are sometimes able to form informal agree-
ments to coordinate when setting prices of complements. After all, it is ben-
eficial for them. The pricing game is an analog of prisoners’ dilemma, and
according to the ”folk theorem,” one can support cooperation in repeated
prisoners’ dilemma in infinitely-repeated games with sufficiently high discount
factors.
To investigate whether data supports the hypothesis of the tragedy of
anticommons that pricing of complementary goods is inefficient, I run a series
of reduced form regressions. In particular, I am interested in whether the price
in the markets where freight is interlined is higher than in the markets with
no interline. In this exercise, I compare prices in monopolistic markets with
and without an interline, and expect price in the latter group to be higher
on average holding everything else fixed. I select only monopolistic markets
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to isolate the effect of competition from other railroads. As is described in
section 2.2.2, competition within complements may sometimes have ambiguous
effects on prices. While in the monopolistic markets, the effect of double
marginalization must be most pronounced. The regression specification is as
follows,
lnRTMjmt = βXjmt + γILjmt + εjmt (2.14)
where RTMjmt is revenue per ton-mile of product j in market m at time t,
price measure traditionally used in transportation industry. RTM is equal
to freight revenue divided by the weight of load times the distance of haul.
ILjmt is a dummy variable equal to one if the freight was interlined, i.e., if the
product j is a composite of two complementary products. A positive value
of γ would indicate that railroads were not able to internalize the inefficiency
from pricing complements. Xjmt are control variables, including time and
commodity group fixed effects, origin and termination BEA area dummies
and origin and termination railroad dummies.
I follow MacDonald (1987) and other modern literature that studies
rates in the U.S. freight railroad industry in my choice of control variables.
They include two sets of controls, shipment cost characteristics and market
structure indicators. Shipment cost characteristics comprise of the natural
logarithm of length of haul, size of the load, tons per car, an indicator for
private car ownership. I expect negative signs on the coefficients of these
variables. MacDonald uses the volume of shipments between the origin and
destination states as an indicator of the ability to form unit trains and to cap-
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ture economies of scale, I refrain from including this variable into the analysis
as it is likely to suffer from endogeneity problem.
As stated earlier, I only include monopoly markets in this exercise;
therefore, direct competition from other railroads will not influence prices.
However, railroads also compete with other modes of transportation, like truck
and barge. Increasing the distances to port and waterway facilities would
tend to reduce railroad pricing constraints from water transport, as the cost
of accessing the alternative mode increases. This effects should be absorbed
by origin and termination BEA area dummies9.
Table 2.5 provides estimation results on data pooled for all commodity
groups. Signs on all coefficients are consistent with the expectations. I find
that increased length of haul, shipment weight, and weight per car are asso-
ciated with the lower price paid. I also find that shippers pay a lower rate
when using privately owned cars. As expected, IL variable has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient. A route with an interline is 19.5% more
expensive than a route without an interline holding everything else fixed. It
should be noted that all 19.5% may not be attributed to double marginaliza-
tion; there may be potential costs to interlining that make it more expensive
9I tried controlling for distance to the nearest port or waterway facility from origin and
destination points as in MacDonald (1987), but the estimated coefficients on these variables
were not statistically significant. The distance was calculated as great-circle distances be-
tween the origin/destination station zip code and zip code of nearest waterway facility using
NBER ZIP Code Distance Database. Information about waterway facility zip codes was
taken from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Port and Waterway Facilities Navigation Data
Canter.
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
to ship freight on interlined routes. The above result is in line with previ-
ous literature. Schmidt (2001) analyzes data for 1992 and finds that interline
shipment is more costly than single-line shipment. In particular, in monopoly
markets, the prices are 14.4% higher with an interline.
2.5 Structural Model
2.5.1 Consumer Demand
I use a differentiated product model to estimate the demand for railroad
freight transportation. In this model, the characteristic that most differenti-
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ates products from each other is the location of origin and destination stations
and the duration of the haul, which translates into network structure of the
railroad relative to other transportation infrastructure. In every market m at
year t shipper i = 1, ..., Nmt chooses logistic channel k to maximize its utility
(minimize logistic cost of shipment) Uikmt.
Uikmt = xkmtβ + αipkmt + ξm + ξt + ξkmt + εikmt (2.15)
where xkmt is a vector of observable logistic chain characteristics, pkmt is the
price, (β, αi) are the taste parameters for consumer i; ξm and ξt are respectively
market and year fixed effects, ξkmt - market specific taste for each logistic
channel that is unobservable to the researcher but observable to and equally
valued by all consumers, and εikmt is an consumer-specific idiosyncratic term,
iid draws from a Type I extreme value distribution.
Consumer preferences are assumed to depend on the valuations con-
stant across individuals, demographic variables, Di, and parameters Π that
measure how preferences vary with demographics10. Therefore, preferences
have the following distribution across the population:
αi = α + ΠDi (2.16)
I use a proxy for the size of the sipper i as a demographic variable.
Intuitively, we would expect different price sensitivity and ability to substitute
10I also experimented with adding persistent preference heterogeneity in the form of clas-
sical normally distributed preference shocks. While these models led to elasticities that were
similar to the demand specifications above, the standard errors increased; therefore I opted
for a model with only demographic interactions.
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to other providers depending on the size of the shipper. I use the number of
payroll employees as a proxy for the shipper size for all commodity groups
but grains and feed11, and farm sales in thousands of dollars for grains and
feed commodity group. I use Statistics of U.S. Businesses dataset to build
an empirical distribution of firms by the log of the number of employees in
every BEA for a given commodity group in every year. I then fit a Gamma
distribution to the data and draw 1000 observations from the distribution. For
grains and feed commodity group, I use data from the Census of Agriculture,
which is only available for 2002, 2007 and 2012, and thus the distribution of
sales by the farm is extrapolated to the missing years.
The observable characteristics xkmt include a constant, origin and ter-
mination railroad dummy for class I railroads, an indicator of interline on the
route, a total distance of haul, and traveled distance divided by the shortest
road distance to capture the difference in time from shipment to delivery. The
last variable can be relevant because railroads operate on fixed networks that
differ from railroad to railroad. While one company may connect the origin
and destination point with a straight line, another company may need to loop
around. This can also be a deciding factor to shift to outside option. I define
the price variable to be revenue per ton in a thousand dollars, in contrast
to revenue per ton-mile in the reduced form analysis. The reason for this is
that revenue per ton-mile metric will not be representative of a price when the
length of haul is different due to the differences in network structure between
11Statistics of U.S. Businesses does not cover crop and animal production industries.
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origin and destination points. A shipper cares about how much he would pay
to move the freight from origin to destination, and not about the price per
mile.
A shipper can choose the outside option: not to ship by railroad. This
includes shipping by truck, barge, air or pipeline. The logistics cost of the
outside option will depend on the distance to the nearest waterway from the
origin and destination, quality of highways connecting the origin and destina-
tion points, gas prices, etc. However, as only relative differences in utilities of
logistic chains matter, these effects will be captured by market and year fixed
effects. I, therefore, use the traditional normalization: the utility shipper j re-
ceives from choosing the outside option in market t is given by Ui0mt = εi0mt.




exp(xkmtβ + αipkmt + ξm + ξt + ξkmt)
1 +
∑
l exp(xlmtβ + αiplmt + ξm + ξt + ξlmt)
f(αi)dαi (2.17)
2.5.2 Supply
For expositional simplicity, consider a market where two logistic chan-
nels are offered, k and h. Channel k is sold by firm j at price pk = pkj and its
market share is sk, and channel h is a bundle of two complementary products
sold by firms l and r (in the context of freight railroad industry, this means
that railroads l and r interline). I drop market and time indices for notational
simplicity. The composite price of the logistic channel h is ph = phl + phr, and
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its share is sh. The three firms maximize their profits with respect to price.













 pkj − ckjphl − chl
phr − chr
 = 0 (2.18)
or in matrix notation
s+ Ω(p− c) = 0 (2.19)
This model differs from traditional methods to estimate supply in structural
modelling because it has three first order conditions in a market with only two
products. This is due to the fact that one of the products is a bundle of two
components.
I define marginal costs for product k offered by firm j in market m at
time t as a linear function of observable cost factors wkjmt, and a cost shock
ωkjmt that is unobserved by the researcher but known to the firms, so that
ckjmt = γwkjmt + ωkjmt (2.20)
where γ is a vector of marginal cost parameters to be estimated. The vector
wkjmt includes distance, distance squared, a dummy indicating if firm j in-
terlined freight at the origin or termination; railroad, origin and termination
state, and year dummies.
One of the limitations of my data is that I only observe the composite
price of the interlined movement, not the separate prices charged by each
railroad. I estimate the revenue split using the technique proposed by STB.
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Freight revenue is divided by the number of 100-mile blocks traveled by each
railroad in the route. The origin and termination railroad is apportioned
revenue for an additional block, to allow for pick-up and switching expenses.
2.5.3 Identification
My demand model does not differ significantly from most of those used
in modern empirical IO literature, and, therefore, suffers from a traditional
threat to the identification. As is the case generally with demand estimation,
firms might set their prices based on realizations of unobservable determinants
of utility, making price variable endogenous to the choice process. I use two
sets of instruments for identifying heterogeneity in consumer preferences.
First, I use access to the railway tracks at origin and destination BEA
areas. I use yearly data on miles of tracks owned by a railroad in the origin and
termination BEA area from National Transportation Atlas Database, a com-
prehensive database of North America’s railway system. I have access to the
data for years 2008-2014 and extrapolate it to prior years. These instrumental
variables are a version of the variables used in Ciliberto and Williams (2014).
They include average percentage of tracks owned by originating railroad at
origin BEA area and terminating railroad at termination BEA area; average
percentage of tracks owned as a share of class I railroads; level of potential
competition from class I railroads that is defined by the average of percentage
of tracks ownership by class I railroads at origin and termination BEA areas
net tracks owned by originating railroad at origin BEA area and terminating
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railroad in termination BEA area; mean number of class I railroads owning
tracks in origin and termination BEA area; mean number of railroads owning
tracks in origin and termination BEA areas.
In order for our instruments to be valid, they must satisfy two condi-
tions. First, they must be correlated with the price. Access to the railway
tracks by the company and its competitors defines the level of potential com-
petition and, therefore, the ability to charge higher prices. The more extensive
the firm’s network in the area, the easier it is to reach potential clients. Second,
the instruments must be exogenous to the structural error. Because railroad
companies own tracks, they operate on, adjusting access to tracks would mean
building new or retiring old tracks and facilities. Building tracks is a long
and expensive process that requires many layers of approvals and extensive
planning. Therefore, even if the company decides to adjust access to tracks
due to the market-year specific shock, it is unlikely to be realized in the same
year, if realized at all. Figure 2.5 shows how track ownership by class I rail-
roads was changing from 2008 to 2014. It is clear that new tracks are being
built rarely. CPRS is the only railroad that significantly extended the miles of
tracks owned and the majority of the extension happened between 2009 and
2010. Other class I railroads had relatively stable milage of tracks owned from
2009 to 2013.
Second, as additional instruments for prices in the demand equation, I
exploit variation in railroad cost shifters, such as staff wages and other opera-
tional expenses, over time. The economic assumption is that variation in cost
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Figure 2.5: Track Ownership by Class I Railroads
Miles of tracks owned in 2008 are normalized to one.
shifters should be correlated with variation in prices but not with consumers’
preferences for unobservable product characteristics. Every class I railroad
operating within the United States is required to submit the R-1 Railroad
Annual Report to STB. Among other information, the reports provide data
about railway freight operating expenses such as salaries and wages, material
and supplies, purchased services. I use these data to construct three instru-
mental variables: expenditures by railroad company on salaries, materials, and
purchased services per mile operated in a given year. If in the logistic channel
service was provided by interlining multiple railroads, I calculate the average
cost per mile among the railroad companies. Unfortunately, the data is not
available for non-class I railroads, I, therefore, fill the missing values with the
averages.
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Finally, to achieve better identification, for some commodity groups, I
interact the two sets of the instrumental variable with the distance of haul.
For each commodity group, I choose a subset of instruments that provides
the best identification of price coefficient. I take into account first stage F-
statistics, standard errors and personal judgment when choosing the relevant
set of instruments. The description of instrumental variables for each com-
modity group is provided in the appendix along with F-statistics from the
first stage.
Access to tracks at origin and destination BEA areas are also used as
instruments in the estimation of supply model. The intuition for the valid-
ity of instruments is in line with the above. However, the supply side model
is estimated on the logistic chain-firm level, and in the chains with interline,
differences between competition at origin and termination points may matter.
Therefore, I use track ownership instrumental variables in origin and termina-
tion BEA areas instead of averages.
2.5.4 Estimation
I estimate the model using the generalized method of moments (GMM)
in the spirit of the seminal work by BLP12 and the subsequent literature.
Given the large data set and complexity of supply-side estimation, I estimate
the model by commodity group.
12Berry et al. (1995)
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Based on the identification arguments from the previous section, chosen
instrumental variables, Zd, are such that at the true demand parameter values
θ0d, the transitory demand shock ξ(θ
0
d) are uncorrelated with the instruments.
The moment conditions for the demand model can be written as
E[Z ′dξ(θd)] = 0 (2.21)
The moment conditions for the supply side can be written as
E[Z ′sω(θs)] = 0 (2.22)
I stack demand and supply moments and estimate the model parameters by
minimizing the following objective function
θ̂ = arg min
θ
G(θ)′Ŵ−1G(θ) (2.23)




Table 2.6 presents the estimates of the selected demand parameters. I
find the price coefficient to be negative, while the coefficient on price interacted
with a demographic variable that proxies for enterprise size flips sign based
on commodity group. Additionally, the effect of the enterprise size is rather
small for most of the commodity groups and not very significant. This can
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Table 2.6: Estimates of Selected Demand Parameters
Commodity Group Price Π
Automotive Products -66.493*** 1.805**
(9.910) (0.902)
Chemicals, Fertilizer -126.870*** 2.364**
& Plastics (36.165) (1.196)
Coal -178.856*** -3.875*
(38.556) (2.024)
Construction & -155.061*** -6.788***
Forest Products (33.328) (2.427)
Energy Products -86.368** 4.194**
& Fuels (36.708) (1.791)
Food & Beverages -106.484*** 3.442**
(30.963) (1.726)
Grains & Feed -188.754*** 2.189***
(43.177) (1.032)




* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
be a result of the fact that shippers are not very heterogeneous or numerous.
Coal, Construction and Forest Product, and Metals and Minerals have negative
coefficients; while other commodity groups have positive coefficients. This
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indicated that larger firms in the former group are more price sensitive than
the smaller firms. Higher price sensitivity may be a result of the ability of
larger shippers in the group to negotiate better rates, or contract with truck
operators more efficiently. While lower price sensitivity of the larger firms in
the latter group may be a result of long-standing contracts between shippers
and railroad companies, or inability to ship freight via alternative means of
transportation due to the massive amounts of cargo.
Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Estimates of Own Price Elasticity of De-
mand
Commodity Group Mean Median
Standard
Deviation
Automotive Products -4.193 -3.191 4.132
Chemicals, Fertilizer & Plastics -3.997 -3.466 2.867
Coal -2.018 -1.699 1.441
Construction & Forest Products -5.343 -4.810 3.227
Energy Products & Fuels -2.516 -2.284 1.962
Food & Beverages -3.259 -2.466 2.842
Grains & Feed -3.668 -3.510 2.5089
Metals & Minerals -2.774 -2.291 2.099
Intermodal -5.166 -3.839 4.463
Table 2.7 presents descriptive statistics of the estimated own price elas-
ticity of demand across markets by commodity group. The median own price
elasticity is estimated to be between -1.70 and -4.81. This is in line with the
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previous studies that attempted to estimate elasticity of demand in freight rail-
road industry13. The price elasticity is the largest for Construction and Forest
Products, Intermodal, Chemical, and Grains and Feed. The differences in
elasticities can be attributed to the availability of competition in the markets,
both among railroads and other modes of transportation, and substitutability
of the modes. For example, the median elasticity estimate for coal is only -1.70
can be because it is hard and expensive to transport coal by truck, and barge
transportation is not always available.
Supply Estimates.
Table 2.8 provides estimation results for marginal cost parameters. As
expected, I find that the marginal cost of moving one ton of freight is increasing
at a decreasing rate with the distance of haul. The result is consistent for
all commodity group; however, the rate at which cost increases varies. For
example, the coefficient on distance is the largest in Automotive Products
commodity group. This most likely because automotive products are hauled
on the flat cars most of the time, and the weight per car is relatively small,
which translates into higher cost per mile. The average revenue per ton-mile is
also the largest for Automotive products commodity group. Interlining freight
at the origin or termination has a negative impact on marginal cost. This is
due to the costs associated with loading and unloading freight at origin and
destination points.
13Abdelwahab (1998), Hsing (1994), Rich et al. (2011), Rich et al. (2009)
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Table 2.8: Marginal Cost Estimates




Automotive 0.1261*** -0.0358*** -0.0543*** -0.0572*** 0.1121
Products (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0018)
Chemicals, 0.0291*** -0.0078*** -0.0130*** -0.0146*** 0.0409
Fertilizer
& Plastics
(0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Coal 0.0135*** -0.0049*** -0.0084*** -0.0091*** 0.0192
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Construction & 0.0370*** -0.0110*** -0.0146*** -0.0113*** 0.0395
Forest Products (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Energy Products 0.0353*** -0.0152*** -0.0150*** -0.0157*** 0.0485
& Fuels (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Food & 0.0470*** -0.0108*** -0.0206*** -0.0199*** 0.0319
Beverages (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Grains & Feed 0.0321*** -0.0124*** -0.0162*** -0.0154*** 0.0276
(0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Metals & 0.0356*** -0.0092*** -0.0111*** -0.0104*** 0.0375
Minerals (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Intermodal 0.0928*** -0.0261*** -0.0525*** -0.0460*** 0.0459
(0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013)
** p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Note: Marginal cost (dependent variable) is in 1,000, distance in 10,000.
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Median of the marginal cost normalized by distance across all mar-
kets for a commodity group varies from $0.112 for Automotive Products to
$0.019 for coal. A Study of competition in the U.S. freight railroad industry
conducted on behalf of STB (Eakin et al. (2008)) found that industry aver-
age marginal cost per ton-mile was about 1.75 cents in 2006 in the year 2000
dollars. Readjusting for inflation and taking into account that I estimate eco-
nomic costs, meaning that they also include opportunity costs, my results are
not too far away from those found in the study. Bulk goods, such as coal
and grain have relatively lower marginal cost as compared to general freight.
Intuitively, the cost is lower for bulk commodities, because railroads utilize
dedicated unit trains to move grain or coal solely, which reduces operational
cost. This is in line with the findings of Ivaldi and Mccullough (2010) that
estimate Generalized McFadden cost function for bulk, intermodal and general
freight.
2.6 Merger Simulations
In this section, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the wel-
fare effect of mergers in the freight railroad industry. I compare the current
state of the market to four counterfactual scenarios. In each of the scenario,
I will let one of the firms that operates in the West to coordinate in setting
prices in all markets with one of the firms from the East. This is a simple
approximation of a merger. I assume that this arrangement will not influence
demand in any way other than through the change in prices charged and that it
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will not result in cost changes. I use estimated marginal costs and re-compute
equilibrium price on my data set when full coordination between the two firms
is allowed. Table 2.9 provides welfare effects of merger simulations.















BNSF, NS 1,383 -1,141 242 862 1,104
BNSF, CSXT 457 -255 203 491 694
UP, NS 752 -508 243 723 967
UP, CSXT 416 -222 194 680 874
Four mergers result in positive welfare change, where both firms’ profits
and consumer surplus are increased. The merger of BNSF and NS results in
the largest welfare change with the increase of over $1 billion dollars. The
merger of BNSF and CSXT results in the smallest welfare change of about
$700 million. About 80% of welfare change is attributed to the increase in
the consumer surplus. While these numbers can look like a small portion of
the total industry revenue, they can be substantial to the shippers that are
affected the most.
Results of all four counterfactual scenarios have a typical pattern. As
a group, merging firms and consumers benefit, and outsider firms loose profit.
It is worth noting that while consumers as a group benefit, individual con-
sumers in some markets may suffer due to the merger; in particular, in the
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markets where merging firms compete. Outsider firms, those that are not part
of the merger, loose as a group; however, in some markets outsider firms ben-
efit due to the merger; the result depends on market structure and demand
characteristics. This is in line with the discussion in section 2.2.2. Never-
theless, outsiders often lose due to mergers. They lose in the markets where,
by merging, complementary firms reduce their pricing externality and become
more aggressive competitors to the substitute firm; as well as due to vertical
exclusion post-merger.
Table 2.10 provides a breakdown of welfare effects by commodity group.
Numbers (1)-(9) in the headers are coded commodity groups. Crosswalk of
codes to commodity groups is provided in table 2.11. Most considerable por-
tion of welfare change and consumer surplus change due to mergers of BNSF
and NS, and BNSF and CSXT come from coal. While welfare effects of merg-
ers of UP and NS, and UP and CSXT are split among Chemicals, Coal, Metals
& Minerals, and Intermodal commodity groups, this indicates that different
mergers affect shippers in substantially different ways. The degree of change in
consumer surplus is related to the number of markets in which merging parties
interline, number of markets in which they compete, and corresponding cost
and demand characteristics of the markets. For example, BNSF and CSXT
interline in 163 markets in Intermodal commodity group, and they compete in
28114; because the number of markets where they compete is relatively high as
14Markets here are defined as market-year. Two railroads are defined to compete both
when they have parallel routes, and when they are a part of competing logistic chains. For
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Table 2.10: Welfare Effects of Mergers by Commodity Group and Number of
Markets Served Jointly.
Total Welfare Change as Percentage of Total
Merging
Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BNSF, NS 1% 0% 65% 0% 4% 4% -1% 9% 17%
BNSF, CSXT 2% 5% 70% 0% 9% 4% 0% 2% 8%
UP, NS 1% 20% 20% 0% 5% 2% 0% 21% 31%
UP, CSXT 2% 12% 29% 0% 0% 13% 0% 13% 32%
CS Change as Percentage of Total
Merging
Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BNSF, NS 0% 4% 66% 0% 4% 4% -2% 7% 16%
BNSF, CSXT 2% 9% 67% 0% 10% 5% 0% -2% 9%
UP, NS -7% 23% 25% 0% 4% 2% 0% 19% 33%
UP, CSXT 2% 17% 26% 0% 0% 11% 0% 13% 31%
Number of Markets with Common Interline
Merging
Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BNSF, NS 35 125 69 5 13 40 3 114 316
BNSF, CSXT 24 138 61 3 15 40 2 44 163
UP, NS 61 269 48 10 38 59 0 151 462
UP, CSXT 51 245 43 6 5 106 0 89 404
Number of Markets where Compete
Merging
Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BNSF, NS 57 175 45 21 38 62 18 182 371
BNSF, CSXT 21 180 33 13 12 52 1 138 281
UP, NS 127 293 48 17 42 94 19 152 460
UP, CSXT 42 300 16 9 4 82 1 128 359
Note: See commodity group codes in table 2.11.
example, if in a market two logistic chains are offered, one jointly by BNSF and NS, another
one jointly by UP and CSXT, then BNSF and CSXT would be considered as competitors.
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Table 2.11: Commodity Group Codes
Code Commodity Group
(1) Automotive Products
(2) Chemicals, Fertilizer & Plastic
(3) Coal
(4) Construction & Forest Products
(5) Energy Products & Fuel
(6) Food & Beverages
(7) Grains & Feed
(8) Metals & Minerals
(9) Intermodal
compared to the markets where they interline, the welfare effects of the merger
of this pair for Intermodal commodity group is not large.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate the welfare implications of mergers in the
freight railroad industry in the United States. In the markets where firms
sell both substitutes and perfect complements, the welfare effects of a merger
is twofold. First, it may be welfare reducing due to the increased price of
substitutes. Second, it may be welfare enhancing due to decreased inefficiency
from the pricing of complements.
The freight railroad industry is distinct from other modes of freight
transport in a way that railroad companies own the tracks they operate on,
and the owner of the track is usually the sole operator on the line. There is
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no single transcontinental railroad company, and if a shipper needs to move
freight from the east coast to the west coast, he needs to employ services of
at least two different railroad companies. There are two duopolies, one in the
West, with BNSF and UP, and one in the East, with NS and CSXT.
I estimate a structural model of demand and supply in the freight rail-
road industry for nine distinct commodity groups and using the estimated
parameters conduct pairwise merger simulations to connect two coasts. I find
that all four mergers result in positive welfare changes where both firms and
consumers benefit. BNSF and NS merger results in the largest welfare in-
crease. Merging firms and consumers benefit from the mergers as a group,
while firms that are outsiders to the mergers lose profits.
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Chapter 3
Tacit Collusion with Complements in the
Freight Railroad Industry
3.1 Introduction
The standard literature on tacit collusion concentrates on how it influ-
ences the pricing of substitutes. However, collusion is also likely to influence
the pricing of complements. For example, in static equilibrium, if two local
monopolists were selling complementary products, they would charge a higher
price than if both products were offered by a single multiproduct monopolist,
reducing both the industry profits and the consumer surplus. However, if firms
were able to coordinate, they could reach a Pareto improvement by lowering
prices to the monopolist level. Therefore, in the markets where firms sell both
substitutes and perfect complements, the welfare effect of tacit collusion is
twofold. First, it may be welfare reducing due to the increased price of substi-
tutes. Second, it may be welfare enhancing due to decreased inefficiency from
the pricing of complements.
I incorporate a model of pricing of complementary products with a
model of cooperation when firms meet in multiple markets and analyze this
question in the context of the U.S. freight railroad industry. The question is
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relevant to the industry, because there is no single transcontinental railroad
company, and a shipper that needs to move goods from the east coast to the
west coast would have to use the services of multiple railroads, and therefore,
purchase perfect complements. Freight railroads own the infrastructure they
operate on, including tracks, and therefore, most of the time, the owner of the
tracks is the sole operator on the line. There are two geographical duopolies,
one in the East and one in the West, and a couple of other companies that
offer routes in the northern part of the U.S. and Canada, along Mississippi
River, and in the South and Mexico. No merger proposal has been submitted
to the freight railroad industry regulator since the 2000s. However, some
of the railroad industry experts are convinced that the industry will become
even more consolidated. Hunter Harrison, a former CEO of Canadian Pacific
Railway, stated that the ”final round of mergers is not a question of if, but
when.” Therefore, it is important to understand the welfare implications of this
consolidation. It is not the intent of this chapter to provide a merger simulation
analysis. Nevertheless, the findings of this chapter can help understand the
scope of the competition in the industry, and whether vertical merger to form
a transcontinental railroad will increase efficiency by removing the problem of
complementary goods pricing. Recent decisions by the Antitrust agencies in
the U.S. and the EU highlighted that efficiencies from eliminating the ”tragedy
of anticommons” and reduced competition should be carefully weighted against
each other.
The economic theory of complements or “tragedy of anticommons”
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dates back to Cournot (1838). Researches have analysed different forms of
coordination that can be established to take better account of the interactions
between demands for complementary goods. For example, airline codeshar-
ing agreements (Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueckner (2003), Ito and Lee
(2005)), or alliances in supply chains (Stallkamp (2001) discusses alliances for-
mations among auto part suppliers, patent pooling (Shapiro (2001), Lampe
and Moser (2010)).
Formal alliances do not need to be established to achieve coordination
in setting fares. Firms may be able to tacitly collude if the market condi-
tions are favorable. I use literature on multimarket contact to study how well
firms can coordinate both in setting rates for complementary products, and
thus reduce inefficiency, and in setting rates for substitutes, and thus reduce
competition. The economic literature has shown that when firms face the
same competitors in many markets, they may achieve cooperative outcome
easier. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) theoretically proved that firms with
multimarket contact could be able to sustain a collusive pricing equilibrium
under repeated competitions with a lower discount factor. Since Bernheim
and Whinston, the effect of multimarket contact on collusive pricing has been
investigated in various industries, such as airline 1, cement 2, telecommunica-
tions 3, radio 4, and many other5. Except for Ciliberto and Williams (2014)
1Evans and Kessides (1994), Singal (1996), Miller (2010), Ciliberto and Williams (2014)
2Jans and Rosenbaum (1997)
3Parker and Röller (1997), Busse (2000)
4Waldfogel and Wulf (2006)
5Movies: Feinberg (2014); hotels: Fernandez and Marin (1998); retail lumber: Shim et al.
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and Shim et al. (2017), most of the research has been conducted as a reduced-
form analysis by regressing the level of contact on price. They find that the
higher level of multimarket contact is associated with increased prices. Cilib-
erto and Williams (2014) estimate a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior,
where conduct parameters are modeled as a function of multimarket contact.
My model is different from Ciliberto and Williams (2014) because it incorpo-
rates pricing of perfect complements into the structural model. To the best of
my knowledge, this is the first model that shows that the level of multimar-
ket contact not only facilitates collusion in setting prices for substitute goods
but also facilitates coordination in pricing complements. This is also a first
research that studies the influence of multimarket contact on cooperation in
the freight railroad industry.
To guide the structural model, and to test for coordination effects in
setting rates, I estimate an analog of a regression from Evans and Kessides
(1994), where I regress price on the level of multimarket contact averaged over
the firms competing in the market. I find that prices are increasing with the
level of contact, which is in line with the hypothesis of ”mutual forbearance.”
In the structural analysis, I extend the model of Ciliberto and Williams (2014)
to account for perfect complements. The model includes conduct parameters
which capture the degree of cooperation and measure the impact of multi-
market contact on collusion. I model conduct parameters as a function of
(2017); pharmaceutical: Coronado et al. (2014); automobile: Leheyda (2008); semiconduc-
tor: Chuang et al. (2018); hospitals: Schmitt (2018); health insurance: Lin and McCarthy
(2018).
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pair-specific multimarket contact, the number of markets in which firms oper-
ate simultaneously, and allow conduct to vary for different commodity groups,
and when firms sell complements and substitutes. I find that the coefficient
on multimarket contact is significant and positive, implying that multimarket
contact leads to higher prices of substitutes than those from a competitive
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, but lower prices of complements. Using the pa-
rameter estimates, I conduct a counterfactual analysis and present welfare
effects of breaking coordination in the pricing of both substitutes and com-
plements, breaking coordination in setting rates for substitutes, but enforcing
full coordination in setting rates for complements, and full collusion.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
short theoretical background on cooperation game in complementary monopoly.
Section 3 defines multimarket contact and presents reduced form evidence.
Section 4 describes the structural model, identification arguments and es-
timation results. Section 5 and present counterfactual analyses. Section 6
concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Cooperation Game in Complementary Monopoly
Section 2.2.1 discusses the theoretical background behind the ”tragedy
of the anticommons” or double marginalization in complementary monopoly.
It explains that firms would be better off if they could cooperate and set the
monopoly price. This is a classic example of a prisoner’s dilemma. If players
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repeatedly interact over time, according to the ”folk theorem,” one can support
cooperation in infinitely-repeated games with sufficiently high discount factors.
Let’s return back to the simple example from section 2.2.1. There are
two goods that are perfect complements, i.e. consuming one without another
gives zero utility. The demand function for the composite good is
Q = Q1 = Q2 = A− (P1 + P2) (3.1)
where P1 is the price of good 1, and P2 is the price of good 2. The marginal
cost of production of good 1 and 2 is c1 and c2 respectively. It has been shown




(A− c1 − c2)2 (3.2)
while in the scenario where firms set a monopoly price and split the profit




(A− c1 − c2)2 (3.3)
Now consider an infinitely repeated cooperation game without uncer-
tainty where on equilibrium path firms set price that results in equal split of
monopoly profits.
PMi =
A+ 3ci − cj
4
(3.4)
If one of the firms deviates, cooperation breaks by reversion to Bertrand pricing
forever. Firm i’s best response function to the price of firm j is
Pi(Pj) =




Therefore, if firm i were to deviate when firm j charges PMj , firm i’s price
would be
PDi =
3A+ 5ci − 3cj
8
(3.6)




(A− ci − cj) (3.7)






(A− ci − cj)2 (3.8)
The above strategy can be sustained as an outcome of a subgame perfect
Nash equilibria if and only if one stage deviation is not profitable, or sum of








This inequality holds when δ ≥ 0.53. Here δ is a discount factor that measures
how ”patient” the firm is. Therefore, with high enough values of a discount
factor, it is possible to achieve cooperation in the infinitely repeated game of
complementary monopoly.
3.2.2 Multimarket Contact and Cooperation Game
Both empirical and theoretical research in the past has been concerned
that the interaction of firms across markets can enhance coordination. Bern-
heim and Whinston (1990) in their seminal paper on multimarket contact
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examine its effect on the degree of cooperation that firms can sustain in a
setting of repeated competition across multiple markets. They find that when
markets and firms are identical, equilibrium outcome does not change when
firms treat markets separately (act like single-product firms in each market) or
make pricing decision considering all markets together as a multimarket firm.
Therefore, multimarket contact does not enhance collusion. They call this ”an
irrelevance result.” Nevertheless, they find that in the industries with differing
markets or firms, multimarket contact may have an impact on the ability of
firms to sustain collusive pricing by relaxing the incentive constraint. Slack in
the incentive constraints from one market can be transferred to the other.
Their theoretical findings can be easily extended to the economy with
perfect complements. Therefore, it may be the case that multimarket contact
has a real effect on the pricing of complements and may be able to reduce
inefficiency from the ”tragedy of the anticommons.” The question of whether
there is the inefficiency and what the effect of the multimarket contact is in
mitigating this inefficiency should be resolved through empirical research.
3.3 Reduced Form Analysis
3.3.1 Multimarket Contact
I define a contact between firms k and h as operating in a market si-
multaneously at time period t. This includes both competing and interlining
freight. For now, let’s break multimarket contact into two separate variables,




kh is the number of markets where two rail-
105





where D ILmtkh is equal to one if firms k and h interline in market m at time t.





where D Cmtkh is equal to one if firms k and h actively compete in market m
at time t. For each year I construct a matrix of these pair-specific variables.
Table 3.1 shows the matrix, mmc ilkh for 2003, and table 3.2 shows the matrix,
mmc ckh for 2003.
Table 3.1: Number of Markets with a Common Interline in 2003
BNSF UP CSXT NS KCS CPRS CN
BNSF 71 64 87 32 7 23
UP 71 94 108 23 25 41
CSXT 64 94 54 6 11 33
NS 87 108 54 19 14 22
KCS 32 23 6 19 0 15
CPRS 7 25 11 14 0 6
CN 23 41 33 22 15 6
The highest level of interline contact is among NS and UP, CSXT and
UP, and BNSF and NS. It comes with no surprise given the rail network
structure. Interlining between railroads serving west, UP and BNSF, and
railroads serving east, NS and CSXT, allows freight to move via rail from
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Table 3.2: Number of Markets where Firms Compete in 2003
BNSF UP CSXT NS KCS CPRS CN
BNSF 508 84 110 54 60 56
UP 508 102 135 69 27 84
CSXT 84 102 464 16 30 67
NS 110 135 464 34 29 78
KCS 54 69 16 34 2 23
CPRS 60 27 30 29 2 22
CN 56 84 67 78 23 22
coast to coast. The highest level of competition multimarket contact by far is
for BNSF and UP, and CSXT and NS, which is again unsurprising, as there
are two geographic duopolies one in the west and one in the east.
I define total multimarket contact, mmctkh, as the sum of mmc il
t
kh
and mmc ctkh. For each year, I then use mmc
t
kh to calculate market-year
specific average of multimarket contact for interlining firms or those selling

















D Cmtkh ·mmctkh/100 (3.13)












kh is the number of pairs of competing firms in market m
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at time t. Thus, AvgMMC Complmt and AvgMMC Substmt are equal to
the average mmctkh across the firms actively competing and interlining in the
market m respectively, divided by 100.
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for AvgMMC variables for the
markets where the contact is non-zero, i.e. in case of AvgMMC Complmt,
summary statistics was calculated over the markets where there is an inter-
line, while summary statistics for AvgMMC Substmt was calculated in non-
monopolistic markets.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistic for AvgMMC Variables
AvgMMC Compl AvgMMC Subs
Mean 1.121 2.736




Note: summary statistics is for the markets where
AvgMMC is non-zero.
3.3.2 Endogeneity of MMC and Instrumental Variables
Ciliberto and Williams (2014) discuss that average multimarket con-
tact is likely to be endogenous to prices because unobservable shocks that
influence price are also likely to affect entry and exit decisions of a firm that
define multimarket contact. I use yearly data on miles of tracks owned by a
railroad in the origin and termination BEA area from National Transporta-
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tion Atlas Database, a comprehensive database of North America’s railway
system, to construct instrumental variables that are used both in reduced-
form and structural analysis. These instrumental variables are a version of
the variables used in Ciliberto and Williams (2014) and are identical to the
instrumental variables discussed in section 2.5.3. The intuition comes from the
fact that a railroad company needs access to rail tracks to serve a market, and
it is unlikely to adjust the mileage of tracks in the origin or termination BEA
area in response to unexpected changes in demand and cost. Because railroad
companies own tracks, they operate on, adjusting access to tracks would mean
building new or retiring old tracks and facilities. Building tracks is a long
and expensive process that requires many layers of approvals and extensive
planning. Therefore, even if the company decides to adjust access to tracks
due to the market-year specific shock, it is unlikely to be realized in the same
year, if realized at all.
3.3.3 Multimarket Contact in the Freight Railroad Industry
In this section, I conduct a series of reduced form analysis to investigate
whether multimarket contact influences prices in the freight railroad industry.
First, I test if multimarket contact facilitates cooperation in setting prices of
complementary goods and helps reduce inefficiency. I run a regression anal-
ogous to (2.14) and additionally control for the level of average multimarket
contact between interlining firms.
Table 3.4 provides estimation results for OLS and IV regressions. The
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AvgMMC Compl -0.009 -0.050**
(0.006) (0.024)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
coefficient on IL is positive and statistically significant in both cases. The
coefficient on average multimarket contact is negative in both cases and sta-
tistically significant at 5% significance level in the instrumental variable esti-
mation. This means that higher contact between interlining firms is associated
with a lower price. To understand the economic significance of the estimated
coefficient I follow Evans and Kessides (1994) and multiply it by the change
in AvgMMC Compl when moving from the market with an interline with the
twenty-fifth percentile in contact to a market with the seventy-fifth percentile,
which is 1.25. Such a change in multimarket contact corresponds to a change
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of 6.3% in revenue per ton-mile in IV regression. Therefore, the total effect of
interline on railroad rates in monopoly markets is estimated to vary between
30.8%, in the markets with the lowest contact, and almost 0%, in the markets
with the highest contact.
The exercises above supports the theory of complementary monopoly
pricing. It provides evidence that prices are on average higher in the markets
with complementary goods than in integrated monopoly markets, where a
single firm offers two complements forming a composite good. Moreover, the
magnitude of the price increase varies with the firms selling complements. This
variation may arise from the difference in market conditions the firms operate
in or from the ability to cooperate while setting rates. Estimating structural
model will help us understand this phenomenon better.
Next, I replicate the work of Evans and Kessides (1994) in the setting
of the freight railroad industry. Evans and Kessides test the hypothesis that
multimarket contact facilitates collusion by regressing logarithm of price on
average multimarket contact. The regression specification is as follows
lnRTMjmt = βXjmt + αAvgMMC Subsmt + εjmt (3.14)
where j indexes product, m markets, and t year. The dependent variable and
control variables, Xjmt, are as in (2.14) plus an interline dummy ILmt. As be-
fore, I include time and commodity group fixed effects, origin and termination
BEA area dummies and origin and termination railroad dummies. The main
variable of interest is AvgMMC Subsmt and I expects its coefficient to be
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positive. In this specification ILmt is equal to 1 if a product with an interline
is offered in the market. Microeconomic theory suggests that in differentiated
product markets if one of the products offered is a composite of complementary
goods sold by different firms, then prices for all products in the market will
be higher than if an integrated firm was offering the complementary goods.
Therefore, I expect the coefficient on ILmt variable to be positive. This is an
additional test for the existence of the tragedy of anticommons.
Table 3.5: Effect of Multimarket Contact on Revenue per Ton-Mile













AvgMMC Subs 0.004*** 0.191***
(0.001) (0.036)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column (1) of table 3.5 estimates the model using ordinary least squares
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estimation procedure. Column (2) of table 3.5 presents results from instru-
mental variable regression. As discussed above, AvgMMC Subsmt variable is
likely to be endogenous because it is determined by the entry and exit deci-
sions of the firm. Instrumental variables are defined and discussed in section
3.3.2. Estimated coefficients on control variables have expected sign, and their
magnitude is consistent with previous research on rate setting in the freight
railroad industry. The coefficient on IL variable is positive and statistically
significant. It indicates that prices in the markets with at least one inter-
line among transportation options offered are about 10% higher than in the
markets without interlines, ceteris paribus. The coefficient on average multi-
market contact among competing firms is positive and statistically significant
and is equal to 0.191. Moving from an oligopolistic market with the twenty-
fifth percentile in contact to a market with the seventy-fifth percentile changes
multimarket contact by 3.42 and would increase revenue per ton-mile by 65.3%.
3.4 Structural Model
3.4.1 Model
In this section, I provide a structural model of cooperation when firms
meet in multiple markets. I use a differentiated product model to estimate the
demand for railroad freight transportation. The demand side of the model is
identical to the one discussed in section 2.5.1. In the modeling supply side,
I follow Ciliberto and Williams (2014) and extend their model to account
for perfect complements. They use the degree of pair-specific multimarket
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contact between carriers as a ”market environment” shifter. The idea is that
higher levels of multimarket contact between firms may facilitate cooperation
in setting rates. They define conduct parameter, the degree of coordination
between carriers l and r, as a function of the level of multimarket contact,
f(mmclr). If conduct parameter is equal to zero, they conclude that the firms
do not cooperate. If the conduct parameter is equal to one, then firms can
sustain a fully collusive outcome. Conduct parameter between zero and one
would indicate that firms are coordinating up to some extent, but not fully.
In the markets where firms with high conduct parameter sell substitutes, the
prices are expected to be higher than in Bertrand-Nash outcome, and therefore
collusion is welfare reducing. However, in the markets where firms sell perfect
complements, the high level of cooperation will translate into lower prices, and
higher welfare, as the inefficiency of ”tragedy of anticommons” will be reduced.
For expositional simplicity, consider a market where two logistic chan-
nels are offered, k and h. Channel k is sold by firm j at price pk = pkj and its
market share is sk, and channel h is a bundle of two complementary products
sold by firms l and r (in the context of freight railroad industry, this means
that railroads l and r interline). I drop market and time indices for notational
simplicity. The composite price of the logistic channel h is ph = phl + phr,
and its share is sh. The three firms solve profit maximization problem with
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 pkj − ckjphl − chl
phr − chr
 = 0 (3.15)
or in matrix notation
s+ Ω(θ)(p− c) = 0 (3.16)








As in Ciliberto and Williams (2014) the first-order conditions now have addi-
tional cooperative terms as compared to Bertrand first order condition. These
terms depend on the size of the conduct parameter, degree to which firms
coordinate in setting rates, and the derivatives of shares with respect to the
prices. If the products that two firms are offering are substitutes, then the
degree to which cooperation increases prices depends on the level of substitu-
tion of the two products. The closer the substitutes are, the higher the fares
will be compared to Bertrand-Nash outcome. If the two products are perfect
complements, then the higher the own price elasticity is, the lower the price
will be. Recall, that the ”tragedy of anicommons” in the context of pricing of
perfect complements arises because firms do not take into account each others
margins. In FOC (3.17) θlr denotes the extent to which firm l incorporates
margin of firm r into its pricing decision.














where h indicates if the products are substitutes or complements. The reason
for estimating conduct parameters separately for substitutes and complements
is that apart from multimarket contact, firms may be able to utilize other le-
gal instruments to achieve Pareto-improvement in setting fares on interlined
freight. I expect φ2 to be positive, which would indicate that multimarket con-
tact facilitates cooperation. This functional form bounds conduct parameters
between zero and one and allows for imperfect collusion.
In principle, conduct parameters may vary across markets, as pointed
out by Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Fan et al. (2018). However, es-
timating a fully flexible conduct matrix would require a prohibitive number
of instrumental variables. To keep the estimation tractable, the need to re-
strict the structure of the conduct parameter in an economically reasonable
way arises. I estimate a vector of parameters φ separately for each commodity
group, allowing the level of cooperation to vary across commodities.
I define marginal costs as a linear function of observable cost factors
wkjmt, and a cost shock ωkjmt identical to the section 2.5.2, so that
ckjmt = γwkjmt + ωkjmt (3.19)
where γ is a vector of marginal cost parameters to be estimated. The vector
wkjmt includes distance, distance squared, a dummy indicating if firm j in-
terlined freight at the origin or termination; railroad, origin and termination
state, and year dummies.
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3.4.2 Identification
Identification of demand-side parameters is discussed in the section
2.5.3. The primary difficulty of the supply side estimation is to separately
identify the level of industry conduct from unobserved marginal cost shocks.
Pair-specific multimarket contact is likely to be endogenous, as discussed in
section 3.3.2. Supply-side first-order optimality conditions are conducive in
understanding the type of variation needed to identify conduct parameters.
The main determinants of the prices are cross-price and own-price elasticities
and pair-specific multimarket contact. Thus, to identify the degree of coor-
dination in setting fares, one must have instruments that explain both the
substitutability of carriers’ service and which carriers serve the market. Track
ownership instrumental variables do well in identifying these relationships,
because they capture the identity of the firms that can potentially serve the
market, and the level of potential competition in the market, i.e., if service can
be provided by other railroads and how easily, this identifies substitutability.
3.4.3 Estimation
I estimate the model using the generalized method of moments (GMM)
similar to the estimation procedure in the section 2.5.4. Supply side adds vec-
tor φ to the outer loop routine of BLP estimation. Combining equations (3.16)
and (3.19), one can rewrite cost shock as a function of conduct parameters,
ωkjmt = ω(φ
0). The moment conditions for the supply side can be written as
E[Z ′sω(φ
0)] = 0 (3.20)
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I stack demand and supply moments and estimate the model parame-
ters by minimizing the following objective function
θ̂ = arg min
θ
G(θ)′Ŵ−1G(θ) (3.21)
where G(θ) is set of stacked moments, and Ŵ−1 is a consistent estimate of
weighting matrix.
3.4.4 Results
Demand-side estimation results and results of the estimation of marginal
cost parameters are in line with the results in section 2.5.5. They can be found
in the appendix.
Table 3.6 provides estimates of conduct parameter coefficients. Esti-
mates vary by commodity group and when firms sell substitutes or comple-
ments. The common trend is that multimarket contact is positively correlated
with the conduct. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot these relationships. We can see that
conduct parameter for complements if non-zero even for the firms that meet
in few markets. This is in line with the economic literature that firms may
be able to internally achieve Pareto improvement and reduce the inefficiency
form pricing complements. The fact that conduct parameters differ across
commodity groups is also in line with the theory. Bernheim and Whinston
(1990) find that if goods are differentiated and firms meet in multiple markets
when firms cannot sustain a fully collusive outcome, they may be able to gain
by shifting market power between markets. The level of collusion that firms
can sustain depends on the cost structure and market conditions.
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Commodity Group Const MMC Const MMC
Automotive Products -5.928** 0.030** -0.913** 0.006**
(2.995) (0.015) (0.431) (0.003)
Chemicals, Fertilizer
& Plastics
-7.154** 0.017** -1.682** 0.008*
(3.473) (0.008) (0.818) (0.005)
Coal -21.248*** 0.059*** -8.005** 0.060**
(5.172) (0.020) (3.848) (0.030)
Construction &
Forest Products
-4.889*** 0.019*** -1.765*** 0.016**
(1.856) (0.006) (0.735) (0.008)
Energy Products
& Fuels
-7.542* 0.051** -1.989*** 0.010***
(4.436) (0.026) (0.664) (0.003)
Food & Beverages -6.875*** 0.020** -1.005** 0.005***
(2.050) (0.010) (0.510) (0.002)
Grains & Feed -2.874** 0.022** -0.991** 0.012*
(1.402) (0.011) (0.481) (0.007)
Metals & Minerals -4.878*** 0.027** -2.086** 0.030**
(1.606) (0.014) (0.998) (0.015)
Intermodal -4.763*** 0.017*** -1.567*** 0.006***
(1.360) (0.005) (0.522) (0.002)
* p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Figure 3.1: Conduct Parameters as Functions of Multimarket Contact: Sub-
stitutes
Figure 3.2: Conduct Parameters as Functions of Multimarket Contact: Com-
plements
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide a one-to-one mapping from the level of mul-
timarket contact to the level of cooperation that railroad companies could
sustain while setting rates for substitutes and complements in 2003 in Metals
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& Minerals commodity groups markets. BNSF - UP and CSXT - NS pairs
had the highest level of multimarket contact, they met in 579 and 518 markets
respectively. The conduct parameter for substitute goods for both pairs is
close to one, indicating that BNSF and UP, and CSXT and NS collude in the
markets where they sell substitutes. The results suggest that firms operating
in the two geographic duopolies are able to sustain close to monopoly price in
Metals & Minerals commodity groups markets, and as can be seen from figure
3.1, this results holds for most of the commodity groups. Now consider CSXT
and BNSF, in 2003 they met in 148 markets. Table 3.7 shows that conduct
parameter for substitutes is equal to 0.29, indicating that CSXT and BNSF
were able to sustain a low level of cooperation. Conduct parameters for other
pairs go as low as 0.008, which implies that they do not coordinate in setting
fares for substitutes.
Table 3.7: Conduct Parameters for Class I Railroads in 2003: Substitutes
Metals & Minerals Commodity Group
BNSF UP CSXT NS KCS CPRS CN
BNSF 1.0000 0.2928 0.6085 0.0720 0.0433 0.0604
UP 1.0000 0.6020 0.8433 0.0836 0.0301 0.1820
CSXT 0.2928 0.6020 0.9999 0.0136 0.0219 0.1017
NS 0.6085 0.8433 0.9999 0.0309 0.0214 0.1017
KCS 0.0720 0.0836 0.0136 0.0309 0.0080 0.0208
CPRS 0.0433 0.0301 0.0219 0.0214 0.0080 0.0160
CN 0.0604 0.1820 0.1017 0.1017 0.0208 0.0160
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Table 3.8: Conduct Parameters for Class I Railroads in 2003: Complements
Metals & Minerals Commodity Group
BNSF UP CSXT NS KCS CPRS CN
BNSF 1.0000 0.9133 0.9786 0.6210 0.4735 0.5705
UP 1.0000 0.9780 0.9945 0.6624 0.3715 0.8408
CSXT 0.9133 0.9780 1.0000 0.1937 0.2919 0.7138
NS 0.9786 0.9945 1.0000 0.3785 0.2858 0.7138
KCS 0.6210 0.6624 0.1937 0.3785 0.1165 0.2797
CPRS 0.4735 0.3715 0.2919 0.2858 0.1165 0.2234
CN 0.5705 0.8408 0.7138 0.7138 0.2797 0.2234
Interestingly, firms can sustain coordination in setting fares for com-
plements easier than for substitutes. In Metals & Minerals Commodity Group
in 2003, all pairs composed from four largest railroads (BNSF, UP, CSXT,
and NS) were able to sustain near-perfect coordination in setting rates for
complementary goods.
3.5 Counterfactual Analysis
In this section, I conduct a counterfactual analysis to measure the wel-
fare effect of coordination in setting rates in the freight railroad industry.
I compare the current state of the market to two counterfactual scenarios.
First, that the regulator breaks coordination entirely, both in setting rates for
substitute goods and complements. I implement this by setting all conduct
parameters to be equal to zero. Second, I evaluate the welfare effects of full
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coordination. I simulate an industry with a single multiproduct monopolist
by setting all conduct parameters to one.
Table 3.9: Counterfactual Results: Breaking Collusion (in $B)
∆ Profit ∆ CS ∆ Welfare
Automotive Products -3.383 3.690 0.307
Chemicals, Fertilizer & Plastics -2.593 2.925 0.332
Coal -13.016 19.694 6.678
Construction & Forest Products -0.896 0.935 0.040
Energy Products & Fuels -0.732 0.587 -0.145
Food & Beverages -1.655 1.974 0.319
Grains & Feed -2.958 3.059 0.100
Metals & Minerals -2.133 2.158 0.025
Intermodal -12.699 16.369 3.669
Total -40.065 51.391 11.326
The table 3.9 shows the results of the first counterfactual conducted
on the full data set. I find that the regulation which prohibits coordination
in setting rates both for complements and substitutes increases customer sur-
plus while decreasing company profit. This result is robust across commodity
groups. The positive sign on the change of consumer surplus indicates that
effects of coordination on consumer surplus from pricing substitutes outweigh
the effect from pricing complements. Moreover, in all commodity groups but
Energy Products & Fuels, the welfare change is positive, meaning that con-
sumers gain more than firms lose from breaking collusion.
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Table 3.10: Counterfactual Results: Full Collusion (in $B)
∆ Profit ∆ CS ∆ Welfare
Automotive Products 1.467 -1.816 -0.348
Chemicals, Fertilizer & Plastics 1.919 -2.221 -0.302
Coal 10.528 -10.189 0.339
Construction & Forest Products 0.083 -0.124 -0.041
Energy Products & Fuels 0.651 -0.388 0.263
Food & Beverages 0.594 -0.907 -0.313
Grains & Feed 1.028 -0.966 0.062
Metals & Minerals 2.003 -2.034 -0.031
Intermodal 5.281 -5.427 -0.146
Total 23.555 -24.072 -0.517
The table 3.10 provides results of the second counterfactual. Allowing
full coordination in setting rates has an opposing effect. This policy interven-
tion increases industry profits and decreases customer surplus. However, the
magnitude of the change is lower than in the previous counterfactual. This is
because companies in two geographical duopolies are already able to sustain
close to full collusion.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of multimarket contact on
coordination in the freight railroad industry and measure its welfare effects
on consumers and firms. In the markets where firms sell both substitutes and
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perfect complements, the welfare effect of tacit collusion is twofold. First, it
may be welfare reducing due to the increased price of substitutes. Second,
it may be welfare enhancing due to decreased inefficiency from the pricing
of complements. I extend the framework of Ciliberto and Williams (2014) to
account for pricing of perfect complements and assess the degree of collusion on
reducing the inefficiency caused by the ”tragedy of anticommons.” To the best
of my knowledge, this is the first paper that shows that the level of multimarket
contact not only facilitates collusion in setting prices for substitute goods but
also facilitates coordination in pricing complements.
I find that multimarket contact leads to higher prices of substitutes
than those from a competitive Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, but lower prices of
complements. I also find that the lower level of multimarket contact is needed
to achieve coordination when setting rates for complements, than substitutes.
Using the parameter estimates, I conduct a counterfactual analysis and present
welfare effects of breaking coordination in the pricing of both substitutes and
complements and full collusion. The results suggest that breaking collusion is
welfare enhancing while allowing for full coordination has a small but negative
effect. Unfortunately, due to the model limitations, I am not able to conduct
merger simulations. The conduct parameter is an equilibrium object and thus
will change after a merger.
My analysis is limited in several ways. First, as pointed out by Bern-
heim and Whinston (1990) and Fan et al. (2018), and in line with Corts (1999),
conduct parameters may vary across markets. Future research may estimate
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a more flexible supply model to asses the level of coordination. The model of
Fan et al. (2018) allows for estimation of firm markups with a flexible supply
model and can be extended to account for perfect complements. The limita-
tion of their model is that the solution has not yet been derived for the random
coefficient demand. Second, I only observe the composite price of the inter-
lined movement, not the separate prices charged by each railroad. I estimate
the revenue split using the technique proposed by STB. This technique may






STB Carload Waybill Sample
I use unmasked confidential STB Carload Waybill Sample (CWS) for
the years 2003 through 2014 as the primary data source. The sample is a
collection of railroad waybill records submitted to the STB by rail carriers
that terminate 4,500 or more revenue carloads annually. It is roughly a 3%
stratified sample of shipment level observations which is then expanded to
represent 100% of all rail traffic. The sample includes information about the
origin and destination of the shipment, distance of haul, goods transported,
their weight, railroads participating in the movement, revenue collected, etc.
A small percentage of interlined traffic in CWS was rebilled: reported as two
separate shipments. Data indicates which waybills were rebilled and if rebill
happened at origin or termination. I attempt to correct for rebilling using the
procedure described below. First, I link rebilled waybills that had identical
waybill number, had a common interline point, and originated within 10 days.
Next, I link waybills that had the same car number, equal weight and the
number of carloads, hauled the same commodity, had common interline and
originated within 10 days. Because CWS is a sample, not every waybill will
be represented in the data. Therefore, the above procedure is not able to link
all the rebilled waybills. To further correct for rebilling, I create matching of
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waybills that were rebilled at origin and termination with a common interline
point. If the matching is one-to-one, I link the waybills. If it is not one-to-one,
I use information from Freight Analysis Framework (FAF) to derive tonnage
of freight moved between origin and destination point by rail and create a




I use two sets of instrumental variables to estimate demand in the struc-
tural model. First, I use access to the railway tracks at origin and destination
BEA areas. I use yearly data on miles of tracks owned by a railroad in the ori-
gin and termination BEA area from National Transportation Atlas Database,
a comprehensive database of North America’s railway system. I have access
to the data for years 2008-2014 and extrapolate it to prior years.
• % Tracks Mean - the average percentage of tracks owned by originating
railroad at origin BEA out of all tracks in the area and terminating
railroad at termination BEA area.
• % Tracks CI Mean - the average of percentage of tracks ownership by
class I railroads at origin and termination BEA areas net tracks owned
by originating railroad at origin BEA area and terminating railroad in
termination BEA area.
• % of CI Mean - the average percentage of tracks owned as a share of
class I railroads.
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• N I mean - mean number of class I railroads owning tracks in origin and
termination BEA area.
• N mean - mean number of railroads owning tracks in origin and termi-
nation BEA areas.
Second, as additional instruments for prices in the demand equation, I
exploit variation in railroad cost shifters, such as staff wages and other oper-
ational expenses, over time.
• Salaries mile - expenditures by railroad company on salaries per mile
operated
• Material mile - expenditures by railroad company on materials per mile
operated
• PurchServ mile - expenditures by railroad company on purchased ser-
vices per mile operated
If in the logistic channel service was provided by interlining multiple railroads,
I calculate the average cost per mile among the railroad companies. Unfortu-
nately, the data is not available for non-class I railroads, I, therefore, fill the
missing values with the averages.
Finally, for some commodity groups to achieve better identification, I
interact the two sets of the instrumental variable with the distance of haul.
For each commodity group, I choose a subset of instruments that provides the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2 Demand Parameter Estimates
Table C.1: Estimates of Demand Parameters from Chapter 2
Commodity Group Constant Junction D/RD Distance
Automotive Products 2.361 -0.349 -0.632 0.005
(0.882) (0.381) (0.407) (0.001)
Chemicals, Fertilizer & Plastics 1.769 -0.276 -2.201 0.004
(0.645) (0.345) (0.308) (0.001)
Coal 1.314 -0.431 -0.462 0.003
(0.419) (0.124) (0.164) (0.001)
Construction & Forest Products -1.442 0.435 -1.347 0.005
(0.462) (0.367) (0.215) (0.001)
Energy Products & Fuels -0.805 0.047 -0.615 0.003
(0.754) (0.393) (0.356) (0.001)
Food & Beverages 1.148 -0.271 -3.854 0.005
(0.756) (0.276) (0.660) (0.001)
Grains & Feed 2.085 -0.259 -2.485 0.009
(0.831) (0.235) (0.543) (0.002)
Metals & Minerals -1.090 -0.039 -1.096 0.005
(0.287) (0.403) (0.148) (0.002)
Intermodal -0.799 0.188 -3.115 0.004
(0.482) (0.368) (0.455) (0.001)
D/RD is the ratio of haul distance to the shortest road distance.
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Appendix D
Chapter 3 Parameter Estimates
D.1 Demand Estimates
Table D.1: Estimates of Price Coefficients from Chapter 3
Commodity Group Price Π
Automotive Products -84.304 2.990
(13.192) (1.539)
Chemicals, Fertilizer -145.076 1.674
& Plastics (43.836) (0.889)
Coal -238.933 0.764
(55.112) (0.519)
Construction & -188.125 -8.653
Forest Products (43.669) (3.093)
Energy Products -86.892 3.842
& Fuels (37.300) (1.723)
Food & Beverages -123.564 3.342
(37.725) (1.709)
Grains & Feed -171.214 1.901
(42.298) (0.896)






Table D.2: Marginal Cost Estimates




Automotive 0.0924 -0.0291 -0.0448 -0.0572 0.0938
Products (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0017)
Chemicals, 0.0258 -0.0071 -0.0126 -0.0128 0.0349
Fertilizer
& Plastics
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Coal 0.0106 -0.0043 -0.0070 -0.0082 0.0176
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Construction & 0.0290 -0.0099 -0.0120 -0.0124 0.0350
Forest Products (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Energy Products 0.0316 -0.0124 -0.0156 -0.0140 0.0381
& Fuels (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Food & 0.0415 -0.0086 -0.0176 -0.0139 0.0286
Beverages (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Grains & Feed 0.0264 -0.0091 -0.0144 -0.0152 0.0240
(0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Metals & 0.0278 -0.0076 -0.0077 -0.0093 0.0318
Minerals (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Intermodal 0.0754 -0.0244 -0.0531 -0.0292 0.0396
(0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008)
Note: Marginal cost (dependent variable) is in 1,000, distance in 10,000.
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